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INTRODUCTION
Public officials owe a fiduciary duty to the public and therefore
must comply with a more demanding standard of conduct than that
required by the criminal law.' Breaches of that fiduciary duty, some-
See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) (public official, when
acting as agent for the public, owes a fiduciary duty to the public); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.) ("[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public
official"), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941); County of Cook v. Barrett, 36 Ill. App. 3d
623, 628, 344 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1976) (when an elected "official acts as agent for the
public body in business transactions, he owes to his principal duties of loyalty and good
faith at least equal to those required of a private fiduciary in like circumstances"); State
ex rel. Fletcher v. Naumann, 213 Iowa 418, 431, 239 N.W. 93, 99 (1931) ("public
officers should so conduct their official duties as to be like Caesar's wife, 'above suspi-
cion' of irregularities in the administration of their offices, even though such irregulari-
ties may not, under the law, constitute such willful misconduct . . . as to merit removal
from office"); Burton Township of Genesee County v. Speck, 378 Mich. 213, 224, 144
N.W.2d 347, 350 (1966) (public officers owe "a duty of loyalty to the public no less
than that of an agent to his principal"); State ex rel. Preissler v. Dostert, 163 W. Va.
719, 730, 260 S.E.2d 279, 286 (1979) ("public officer is in the position of a fiduciary
and he is under an obligation to serve the public with highest fidelity and undivided
loyalty"); see also infra note 4 (noting that a public officer may breach a fiduciary duty
without commiting a criminal act).
Numerous jurisdictions have enacted ethics, conflict of interest, and financial dis-
closure laws comprehensively regulating the conduct of public officials. See, e.g., 2
U.S.C. §§ 701-09 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (financial disclosure by members of Con-
gress and congressional employees); AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-311 to -545 (1985)
(conflict of interest, ethics, and financial disclosure legislation); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 4-24 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1987) (conflict of interest laws and
standards of conduct for state, county, and municipal employees). See generally COUN-
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times referred to as official misconduct or violations of the public trust,'
may not necessarily establish a crime, but can lead to a variety of other
consequences that range from public criticism to removal from office.3
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, ETHICS: STATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST/FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 1972-75 (1975)(study of state laws attempting to curb ethi-
cal problems in state governments); Comment, Analysis of Financial Disclosure Laws
of Public Officials, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 641, 641 (1974) (citing state conflict of inter-
est statutes).
In this Article, the term "public official" refers to any government official or em-
ployee, whether elected or appointed.
2 Public office is frequently referred to as a public trust. See, e.g., Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968)
("[Plublic employees subject themselves to dismissal if they refuse to account for the
performance of their public trust, after proper proceedings, which do not involve an
attempt to coerce them to relinquish their constitutional rights."); Benoit v. Gardner,
351 F.2d 846, 849 (1st Cir. 1965) ("[Those appointed to high public office hold a
special public trust; they cannot properly complain if they are the objects of special
scrutiny."); In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 160, 11 So. 2d 316, 319 (1943)
("Public office is the most important trust democratic government vests in the citizen.");
County of Cook v. Barrett, 36 Ill. App. 3d 623, 627, 344 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1976)
(Elected public officials hold positions "of the highest public trust."); THE FEDERALIST
No. 65, at 396 (A. Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961) (Impeachment power covers "those
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust."). See generally Rogers & Young, Public Office
as a Public Trust: A Suggestion That Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemean-
ors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1975) (arguing that established
fiduciary standard should be standard for impeachment).
' See, e.g., Golaine v. Cardinale, 142 N.J. Super. 385, 397, 361 A.2d 593, 599
(Law Div. 1976) ("removal for cause is a remedial proceeding, [and] that cause and the
culpability upon which it is based need not necessarily involve either commission of a
crime or an improper purpose"), affd, 163 N.J. Super. 453, 395 A.2d 218 (App. Div.
1978), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 497, 401 A.2d 252 (1979); In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d
317, 319 (Tex. 1974) (proceeding to remove judge is not a criminal proceeding and
charges need not be established beyond reasonable doubt); State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d
345, 348, 359 P.2d 12, 14 (1961) (public official may be removed from office for an act
or omission which amounts to a crime, "which involves a substantial breach of the trust
imposed upon the official by the nature of his office, and which conduct is of such a
character as to offend against the commonly accepted standards of honesty and moral-
ity"), superseded by statute as stated in Madson v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah
1985); see also R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 62
(1973) (concluding that federal constitutional standard for. impeachment, requiring
proof of "high crimes and misdemeanors," is a term of art "without roots in the ordi-
nary criminal law and which . . . had no relation to whether an indictment would lie
in the particular circumstances"); Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65
Nw. U.L. REV. 719, 731 (1970) (constitutional framers intended "to include non-crim-
inal misconduct within the catalog of impeachable offenses" (citation omitted)).
In some jurisdictions removal from office is a consequence of a criminal conviction
for specified crimes and is a criminal sanction. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-228 to
-230 (1981) (removal upon conviction for buying and selling offices, acting as officer
before qualifying as such, or willful failure to discharge duties); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-5-401 (1982) (removal from and disqualification from holding office upon misde-
meanor conviction).
In this Article, the term "removal" is used generally to refer to any procedure
which can result in the involuntary termination of a public official's term of office or
employment, including termination at the discretion of an appointing authority or
19871
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Grand juries that investigate allegations of official misconduct may
often find it easier to conclude that a public official has committed a
noncriminal rather than a criminal violation of the public trust.
For example, consider the situation in which a public official takes
a discretionary action to benefit a campaign contributor without regard
to the public's best interest. The criminality of that conduct depends on
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the crimi-
nal law beyond a reasonable doubt. However, even if the official did
not commit a crime, the official did breach a fiduciary duty by placing
a private interest above the public interest.4 If the grand jury does not
charge the official with a crime, should it nevertheless have the author-
ity to reveal the violation of the public trust?
There is a consensus among courts and commentators that, histori-
cally, common law grand juries performed a public reporting function
by identifying official misconduct5 without initiating prosecution.8
through a statutorily or constitutionally prescribed removal or impeachment proceeding.
When a particular removal procedure is contemplated, the type of procedure is clearly
identified.
" See Anderson v. City of Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, 341, 496 P.2d 1333, 1337
(1972) ("[A] public officer owes an undivided duty to the public whom he serves and is
not permitted to place himself in a position that will subject him to conflicting duties or
cause him to act other than for the best interests of the public."); Preissler, 163 W. Va.
at 730, 260 S.E.2d at 286 ("[Pjublic officer is in the position of a fiduciary and he is
under an obligation to serve the public with highest fidelity and undivided loyalty.");
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957) ("[An agent is subject to
a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters con-
nected with his agency.").
' The scope of this Article is limited to examining reports that reveal misconduct
by public officials. Therefore, the propriety of a report that concerns misconduct by
private persons is not considered. It is uniformly held, however, that the reporting au-
thority does not include the ability to criticize private persons. See Comment, The Pro-
priety of a Breach of Grand Jury Secrecy When No Indictment Is Returned, 7 Hous.
L. REV. 341, 352 (1970) (noting that a majority of courts hold that "criticism is the
burden of holding public office," and that private citizens, not bearing that burden of
the public trust, should not be subject to the public scorn of a critical report).
See, e.g., In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Con-
cerning Transmission of Evidence to House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219,
1222-23 (D.D.C.) (grand jury permitted to transmit only a report to House Committee
investigating impeachment of President), affd sub nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d
714 (D.C. Cir. 1974); In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled January,
1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 675 (D. Md. 1970) ("[Clommon law powers of a grand jury
clearly include the power to make presentments, sometimes called reports, calling atten-
tion to certain actions of public officials, whether or not they amounted to a crime.");
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 598, 604 (1984); Wood v.
Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 162, 173 N.E.2d 21, 31, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 46 (1961) (Froessel,
J., dissenting) ("At common law, grand juries freely exercised the power to make pre-
sentments or reports . . . ."), superseded by statute as stated in In re Report of Au-
gust-September 1983 Grand Jury III, Term IX, Suffolk County, New York, 103
A.D.2d 176, 479 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1984); Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul
Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1109-10 (1955) (tracing historical com-
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However, there is substantial disagreement on whether the grand jury
should continue to have the common law' or statutory' authority to
mon law grand jury report); Comment, Constitutional Law-Judicial Pow-
ers-Legality of the Grand Jury Report, 52 MICH. L. REV. 711, 721 (1954) (noting
strong evidence that English common law juries made reports without charging a
crime).
' In 1955, one commentator concluded that the grand jury's reporting authority
exists "in the shadow of illegality." Kuh, supra note 6, at 1103. That observation still
holds true today. In the absence of unambiguous constitutional or statutory authoriza-
tion, numerous state courts have held that the grand jury may not reveal official mis-
conduct other than by initiating a prosecution. See, e.g., Ex parte Burns, 261 Ala. 217,
222, 73 So. 2d 912, 915 (1954); State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Report of Grand
Jury, 93 So. 2d 99, 102 (Fla. 1957) (per curiam), superseded by statute as stated in
Kelly v. Sturgis, 453 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Bennett v. Kalamazoo
Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 212, 150 N.W. 141, 144 (1914); Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at
153, 173 N.E.2d at 25, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39; State v. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 334,
164 S.E. 873, 877 (1932); In re Report of Grand Jury, 123 Utah 458, 467-71, 260
P.2d 521, 526-27 (1953). For additional cases, see 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND
JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:03 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the scope of the
grand jury's reporting authority. But see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960)
("[Tihe grand jury merely investigates and reports. It does not try."); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (The grand jury was "brought to this country
by the early colonists and incorporated in the Constitution by the Founders. There is
every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate sub-
stantially like its English progenitor."). Decisions by lower federal courts are divided
on whether the grand jury can take any action critical of an identified person without
returning an indictment. See generally June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1222-26
(collecting authorities); Annotation, Authority of Federal Grand Jury to Issue Indict-
ment or Report Charging Unindicted Person with Crime or Misconduct, 28 A.L.R.
FED. 851, 860-64 (1976) (collecting cases on authority of grand jury to accuse persons
of crime without indicting).
*The American Bar Association takes the position that the "grand jury should not
issue any report which singles out persons to impugn their motives, hold them up to
scorn or criticism or speaks of their qualifications or moral fitness to hold office or
position." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT 4
(1982). However, the Association also emphasized that it was "not proposing that...
grand jury reports be proscribed from commenting on the job that an office holder is
performing; but such reports should not condemn character alone." Id. at 8.
8 In some states the grand jury's authority to issue reports that reveal official
misconduct is precluded by statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-205(4) (1978) (re-
port shall not be used except to exonerate); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 444
(West 1967) (official comment stating that art. 444(A) "continues the prohibition
against the making of general reports"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 346 (West 1969)
(permitting reports of public office, but prohibiting the charging of an individual with
misconduct in order to preserve a person's right to confront her accusers); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-11-11 (1982) (permitting reports recommending changes in government
practices but prohibiting criticism of any person unless an indictment has been re-
turned); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.160 (1980) (permitting reports on broad
issues of public policy that "do not identify or criticize any individual").
A few states authorize the grand jury to report publicly on official misconduct
without initiating a prosecution. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 930 (West 1985) (comments
concerning unindicted person not privileged); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.28 (West 1985)
(report relating to individual may not issue until individual furnished a copy and is
afforded 15 days to file motion to repress or to expunge); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9
1987]
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reveal official misconduct other than through an indictment.
On the one hand, a grand jury report9 that reveals official miscon-
duct has been compared to a "foul blow" and a "hit and run motorist,"
since it may unjustly damage a public official's reputation without pro-
viding a forum for response. 0 Critics of the reporting authority contend
(grand jury may make report censuring public official when official is an intimate part
of deprecated public affairs); N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85-.90 (McKinney 1982
& Supp. 1987) (authorizing report without indictment); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4552 (Purdon 1981) (authorizing reports critical of unindicted individuals but al-
lowing judge discretion to permit individual to file a response); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-191 (1983) (authorizing indictment or report on "any condition which involves
or tends to promote criminal activity"); see also Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713,
716-17, 19 P.2d 292, 293 (1933) (discussing California statute); Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 521 (Fla. 1977) (discussing Florida statute).
Other states permit the grand jury to reveal official misconduct by initiating a removal
action against specified public officials. See infra notes 261-72 and accompanying text.
In 1970, Congress authorized special grand juries that investigate organized crime
to report on noncriminal misconduct by a limited category of government officials and
employees, but did not define the reporting authority of other federal grand juries. See
18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1982); see also infra note 95. During the House debate on the
reporting statute, one of its sponsors noted that it was not "intended to restrict or in
any way interfere with the right of regular Federal grand juries to issue reports as
recognized by judicial custom and tradition."June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1224
n.19 (remarks of Rep. Poff).
' Grand juries occasionally exercise the public reporting function by issuing docu-
ments referred to as presentments. See, e.g., In re Lundy, 208 Misc. 833, 839, 148
N.Y.S.2d 658, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1955). In the grand jury's early development, a present-
ment was a criminal charge initiated by the grand jury on its own knowledge. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298. Today, the use of a grand jury presentment to
initiate a criminal prosecution is obsolete in most jurisdictions. See Ex parte Faulkner,
221 Ark. 37, 40, 251 S.W.2d 822, 823 (1952); Kuh, supra note 6, at 1102-03 n.1;
Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687,
705-06 (1932).
To avoid confusion between the generally obsolete use of a presentment to initiate
a criminal prosecution and the use of a presentment to perform the reporting function,
this Article refers to any grand jury document used to reveal official misconduct with-
out initiating a prosecution as a report.
'0 A [report] is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial document;
yet it lacks its principle attributes-the right to answer and to appeal. It
accuses, but furnishes no forum for a denial. No one knows upon what
evidence the findings are based. An indictment may be challenged-even
defeated. The [report] is immune. It is like the "hit and run" motorist.
Before application can be made to suppress it, it is the subject of public
gossip. The damage is done. The injury it may unjustly inflict may never
be healed.
People v. McCabe, 148. Misc. 330, 333, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1933), super-
seded by statute as stated in In re Report of August-September, 1983 Grand Jury III,
Term IX, Suffolk County, New York, 103 A.D.2d 176, 479 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1984); see
also Brautigam, 93 So. 2d at 102 (report is "no less repugnant to traditions of fair play
than lynch law"); Bennett, 183 Mich. at 212, 150 N.W. at 144 (report "offends every
one's [sic] sense of fair play").
It has been noted that some of the strongest judicial criticisms of the fairness of the
reporting function appear in decisions written during the McCarthy era. See 1 S.
BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 7, § 3:03. Indeed, the leading federal case disap-
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that the public is unable to distinguish between a grand jury report that
reveals noncriminal official misconduct and an indictment that initiates
a criminal prosecution." As a result, the report has been characterized
as a threat to the public official's right to due process of law because it
denies the procedural safeguards of a criminal prosecution, yet results
in the same harm to reputation as a criminal accusation. 2
On the other hand, proponents of the grand jury's reporting au-
thority argue that such reports promote democracy by publicly exposing
government wrongdoing. 3 Moreover, the grand jury report has been
praised as a device to hold public officials accountable under a stricter
standard of conduct than that required by the criminal law. 4 Thus, the
report has been called "one of the most valued and treasured restraints
upon tyranny and corruption in public office."'"
The controversy that surrounds the reporting function was re-
cently revived when a state grand jury in Alaska issued a public report
that recommended that the legislature initiate impeachment proceedings
against the Governor. 6 That an Alaska grand jury issued a report crit-
proving of grand jury reports, In re United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F.
Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), involved a 1952 report prepared under the direction of
Roy Cohn, who would soon gain notoriety as chief counsel to Senator McCarthy.
The report in Electrical Workers accused union officials of communist party mem-
bership and activities. It is uniformly held that the grand jury lacks the authority to
report on misconduct by private persons. See supra note 5. No doubt recognizing that it
could not use the reporting function to criticize private persons, the grand jury did not
identify the criticized union officials in its report. However, the day after the report
was released, the grand jury foreman and prosecutor leaked the names of the officials to
the press. Electrical Workers, 111 F. Supp. at 861. The report revealed that the union
officials had claimed the fifth amendment in testimony before the grand jury and con-
cluded that affidavits they had previously filed with the National Labor Relations
Board attesting to noncommunist party membership were not "'worth the paper they
are written on.' "Id. at 860. In his opinion expunging the report, District Judge Wein-
feld labeled as "highly improper" the prosecutor's questioning of grand jury witnesses
as to their "belief in a Supreme Being, baptism, their particular religious faith, the
length of adherence to it, atheism and agnosticism." Id. at 869-70.
Considering that the report in Electrical Workers alleged misconduct by private
citizens rather than public officials, the method used to identify the criticized union
officials, and other objectionable prosecutorial tactics used during the grand jury's in-
vestigation, it is not surprising that the report received a hostile reaction in the district
court. For a perspective on the issues raised by Electrical Workers and Roy Cohn's role
in the grand jury investigation, written by one of the authors of the union's brief seek-
ing expungement of the report, see A. KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A
PEOPLE'S LAWYER 97-113 (1983).
11 See infra text accompanying note 88.
12 See infra text accompanying note 91.
13 See infra text accompanying note 54.
14 See id.
a PUBLIC PAPERS OF THOMAS E. DEWEY 140-41 (State of New York pub.
1946).
16 REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION CON-
DUCTED INTO THE FAIRBANKS CONSOLIDATED STATE OFFICE LEASE WITH THE
1987]
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icizing a public official is not in itself particularly noteworthy. 7 The
FIFTH AVENUE CENTER 18 (Sup. Ct. Alaska July 1, 1985) [hereinafter ALASKA IM-
PEACHMENT REPORT].
This recommendation was the culmination of the grand jury's investigation into
the award of a $10 million lease of state owned office space. The investigation centered
on allegations that the Governor's office had manipulated the state's competitive bid-
ding process to ensure that the lease was awarded to a partnership that included a
major gubernatorial campaign fundraiser. See id. at 21-67 (summary of evidence). Al-
though the grand jury did not return any indictments, its report concluded that the
Governor's administration "has not best served the interests of the public and is unfit to
fulfill the inherent duties of public office." Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). The report
summarized the evidence heard by the grand jury, quoted extensively from key portions
of the Governor's grand jury testimony, and concluded that in his testimony the Gover-
nor showed "extraordinarily poor recollection" and "a lack of candor and a disrespect
for the laws of this state." Id. at 13-14. The Rules Committee of the Alaska State
Senate responded to the report by holding impeachment hearings. See Inquiry into the
Report of the Grand Jury of the First Judicial District, Superior Court, State of
Alaska Dated July 1, 1985 Before the Senate Rules Committee of the Alaska State
Legislature (transcript of proceedings, July 22, 1985 through August 3, 1985) [herein-
after Senate Impeachment Transcript].
The committee did not, however, adopt articles of impeachment. It adopted a
"clear and convincing evidence" standard to find an impeachable offense. See ALASKA
S.J., 14th Legis., 1st Spec. Sess., at 1490 (Aug. 5, 1985) (Senate Rules Committee,
Inquiry into the July 1, 1985 Grand Jury Report). At the conclusion of its hearings,
the Committee adopted a resolution and report which found that there was substantial,
but not clear and convincing evidence, that the Governor committed an impeachable
offense. ALASKA S. RES. 7, 14th Legis., 1st Spec. Sess. (Aug. 5, 1985) (adopting section
of report and resolution of Senate Rules Committee, ALASKA S.J., 14th Legis., 1st
Spec. Sess., at 1491 (Aug. 5, 1985)).
Several senators challenged the legality of the report that triggered the impeach-
ment inquiry. See, e.g., ALASKA S.J., 14th Legis., 1st Spec. Sess., at 1500 (Aug. 5,
1985) (Senate Floor Statement-Due Process: Rights of the Accused, Statement of Sen.
Ferguson) ("While I find nothing wrong with . . . a report containing recommenda-
tions concerning the public welfare and safety, I find the legal basis of allowing a grand
jury to issue a report naming a public official without returning an indictment to be
deliberately or unprofessionally negligent."); see also infra note 19 (remarks of Sen.
Ziegler).
The Alaska Senate took no action on the report adopted by the committee but
amended the Resolution to remove all language critical of the Governor. ALASKA S.J.,
14th Legis., 1st Spec. Sess., at 1499, 1505-06 (Aug. 5, 1985).
The Alaska report is discussed in detail infra at text accompanying notes 167-227.
7 Grand juries in Alaska frequently issue public reports pursuant to their state
constitutional authority "to investigate and make recommendations concerning public
welfare and safety." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8. This constitutional provision is
unique to Alaska and was cited by the grand jury as authorizing its report. See ALASKA
IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 4. Between 1961 and 1971, Alaska grand
juries issued 28 reports on a wide variety of topics, including overcrowding in state
prisons, sentences for criminal defendants, drug abuse by minors, and the use of elec-
tronic listening devices. See Memorandum from Don C. Bauermeister, Court Rules
Attorney, to Arthur H. Snowden, II, Administrative Director, at 80-91 (Sept. 30, 1985)
(Alaska Court System; Criminal Rule 6: Grand Jury Procedure) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review). Moreover, two previous reports had criticized
public officials and recommended their discipline or removal. See Memorandum from
Daniel W. Hickey, Chief Prosecutor, to Harold M. Brown, Attorney General, at 28-29
(Aug. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor] (discussing two grand
jury reports that recommend discipline or removal of correctional officers). Reports is-
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significance of the report, however, is that it criticized the Governor
and called for the initiation of impeachment proceedings."8 It is there-
fore not surprising that the report was controversial and that the grand
jury was criticized for "passing the buck" to the legislature by recom-
mending impeachment instead of indicting the Governor."
The concern that the Alaska grand jury passed the buck to the
legislature did not directly challenge the grand jury's authority to re-
port on the Governor's noncriminal misconduct.20 Indeed, such author-
sued since 1971 are summarized in ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE INVESTIGATIVE
GRAND JURY IN ALASKA 44-48 (1986). For a detailed review of the reporting author-
ity of Alaska grand juries, see Note, The Reportorial Power of the Alaska Grand Jury,
3 ALASKA L. REV. 295 (1986).
18 Although this was apparently the first time that a grand jury report called for
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against a governor, at least two reports have
recommended impeachment of other public officials. See In re Report of Ormsby
County Grand Jury, 74 Nev. 80, 82, 322 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1958) (urging impeachment
of surveyor general); In re the Presentment Made to the Superior Court by the Cam-
den County Grand Jury on or About October 11, 1951, 10 N.J. 23, 48, 89 A.2d 416,
432 (1952) (citing a report issued in 1903 recommending impeachment of a justice of
the peace); see also 3 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES § 2488 (1907) (presentment against territorial judge for-
warded to House of Representatives for consideration of possible impeachment
proceedings).
19 See, e.g., Alaskans Debate Grand Jury Process, Report, Juneau Empire, July
16, 1985, at 1, col. 1, 1, col. 2 (remarks of Al Baffone, Sr., business manager and
secretary treasurer of Public Employees Local 71 in Anchorage) (" 'I can't understand
why the grand jury didn't fulfill their obligations to the state by indicting the governor
if he committed something wrong to the extent that he deserved to be impeached
....' "); Senators Study Grand Jury Testimony, Juneau Empire, July 12, 1985, at 1,
col. 1, 14, col. 4 (remarks of State Sen. Ray) (" 'If there was an indictable offense why
didn't the jury simply indict . . . ?' ").
Moreover, both the grand jury and the prosecutor who presented the case were
accused of acting illegally. See, e.g., Senate Impeachment Transcript, supra note 16, at
123 (July 22, 1985) (statement of Phillip Lacovara, counsel for the Governor during
the impeachment hearings) (asserting that the grand jury acted illegally in issuing its
report); Full Alaska Senate to Question Governor Today, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1985,
at A8, col. 3 (remarks of State Sen. Robert Ziegler) ("This grand jury was led down a
path where it violated every sense of fairness and decency. It embarked on courses of
action that are unethical and illegal."); Alaskans Debate Grand Jury Process, Report,
supra, at 1, col. 2 (remarks of AI Baffone, Sr.) ("'Frankly, under the circumstances, it
appears to me that the grand jury ought to be indicted for wrongdoing! ").
After the impeachment proceedings were concluded, the Alaska Senate's chief
counsel during the inquiry, Sam Dash, agreed that the grand jury acted improperly in
issuing its report. See Impeachment Adversaries Say Jury Wrong in Issuing Report,
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Aug. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1, 1, col. 2.
20 It has generally been assumed that the purpose of a grand jury report is to
reveal official misconduct falling short of a crime. The leading case that supports the
grand jury's reporting authority, for example, refers to it as a device to reveal "official
acts and omissions that fall short of criminal misconduct and yet are not in the public
interest." Camden, 10 N.J. at 66, 89 A.2d at 444; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a)(1)
(1982) (limiting the reporting authority of special grand juries to noncriminal conduct
relating to organized crime); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(c) (defining the grand jury's
authority to report on official misconduct as limited to the ability to reveal "non-crimi-
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ity is a valuable and necessary device in a democratic society. Instead,
concern arose from the perception that, at times, the report accused the
Governor of criminal misconduct and, moreover, suggested that the
grand jury had chosen not to indict because the jurors viewed their
report as a preferable alternative to prosecution of the Governor.21 An
analysis of the interests expressed by the grand jury for this preference,
coupled with the need for judicial review of a report before release, will
reveal, however, that those interests are not served by the use of a re-
port as an alternative to a prosecution.22
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I briefly traces the
common law origins of the grand jury's reporting function. Part II ex-
amines four reports that reveal violations of the public trust and identi-
fies and discusses the competing interests implicated by the reporting
function. Part III reviews those interests and suggests the appropriate
scope of the grand jury's authority to reveal official misconduct without
returning an indictment. Although the Article concludes that grand jury
reports can continue to serve an important function by identifying vio-
lations of the public trust that are not indictable, it rejects the use of a
public report as an alternative to a prosecution.
nal" misconduct). Reports that suggest that a public official has committed a crime
have been held to be improper. See In re Jordan, 439 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D. W. Va.
1977); Biglieri v. Washoe County Grand Jury Report Dated March 15, 1976, 95 Nev.
696, 698, 601 P.2d 703, 704 (1979); In re the Presentment Made to the Superior
Court by the Camden County Grand Jury, 1959 Term, First Stated Session, on or
About June 7, 1960, 34 N.J. 378, 389-91, 169 A.2d 465, 471-72 (1961). See also In re
Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 159, 11 So. 2d 316, 319 (1943) (striking language
in report that grand jury decided not to indict in part because conviction appeared
unlikely), superseded by statute as stated in Kelly v. Sturgis, 453 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
21 See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
22 Indeed, some courts have held that a report should not be used as an alternative
to a prosecution. See In re Messano, 16 N.J. 142, 147, 106 A.2d 537, 539 (1954) (a
grand jury may not issue a report "if it appears that a crime has been committed for
which an indictment may be had"); In re Investigation into the Hamilton Township
Bd. of Educ., 205 N.J. Super. 248, 250, 500 A.2d 744, 745 (App. Div. 1985) ("Prior
to [preparing a report] . . . censuring a public official for abuse of his office, the Grand
Jury must resolve that the evidence before it is insufficient or lacking for a criminal
indictment against him for the same wrongdoing."); Kuh, supra note 6, at 1126-27
("recognition of the difficulties of conviction, even though technically a legal case can be
made out and the accusatory body convinced of guilt, should not induce accusation by
report"). But see In re Second Report of the November, 1968 Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d
200, 213, 257 N.E.2d 859, 866, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297, 307 (1970) (Brietel, J., dissenting)
("[t]he report may be submitted not only in the event that no criminal conduct has been
found, but also when the grand jury, in the exercise of its broad discretion, chooses not
to file an indictment or criminal information, yet feels obliged to report concerning
noncriminal misconduct in office"), superseded by statute as stated in In re Report of
August-September, 1983 Term Grand Jury III, Term IX, Suffolk County, New York,
103 A.D.2d 176, 479 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1984).
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I. COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF THE REPORTING FUNCTION
The grand jury serves as both a sword and a shield.23 As a sword,
the grand jury provides the investigatory resources often required to
initiate a prosecution; as a shield, it protects the innocent from unjusti-
fied prosecution.24 It is generally agreed, however, that in its develop-
ment the grand jury had sharpened its sword to a fine point long before
it acquired its shield.25 Although a comprehensive discussion of the his-
torical development of the grand jury is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, a brief review is necessary to place the emergence of the grand
jury's reporting authority in perspective.
Most authorities trace the origins of the grand jury to the reign of
Henry II and the publication of the Assize 6f Clarendon in 1166.26
During the first five hundred years of its existence, the grand jury
served exclusively as a sword for the Crown to consolidate power and
to prosecute suspected lawbreakers.2 The first evidence of the grand
jury functioning as a shield for the accused does not appear until 1681,
when grand juries in the Colledge and Shaftesbury cases refused to in-
23 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (The grand jury's
"responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against un-
founded criminal prosecutions."); United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir.
1985) ("[Tihe grand jury is as a matter of fact an investigative arm of the prosecutor's
office, as a matter of liberty it is a protection for the liberty of the citizen."); In re
Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671
(D. Md. 1970) ("The Grand Jury is both a sword and a shield."(citation omitted)).
214 See generally 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.1, .3
(1984) (analyzing the dual functions of the grand jury and the investigative advantages
that the system affords).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
26 See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 8.2(a); T. PLUNKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112-13 (5th ed. 1956); 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151-53 (2d ed. 1898); Helmholz, The
Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 613
(1983). But see Schwartz, Demythologising the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10
AM. GRIM. L. REV. 701, 705-07 (1972) (tracing the modern day grand jury to the
signing of the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164).
The Assize authorized "twelve most lawful men" to be put under oath and, after
they were questioned by justices of the peace and sheriffs, directed to accuse anyone
"believed to be a robber, murderer, thief, or a receiver of such." Assize of Clarendon,
Chapter I, reprinted in T. PLUNKNETT, supra, at 112-13. See generally 2 F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 641-48 (discussing the composition of grand juries
and procedures for presentments and indictments).
If the accusation was based on the grand jurors' personal knowledge, the formal
charge was called a presentment. See supra note 9. The Crown initiated an accusation
and submitted it to the grand jury in the form of an indictment, endorsed by the grand
jury as either a "true bill" if charges were justified, and "ignoramus" if not. See S.
WEBB & B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT: THE PARISH AND THE COUNTY 448 (1906).
217 See Kuh, supra note 6, at 1106-07; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 709-10.
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dict supporters of the Protestant cause accused of treason by King
Charles I.8
Around the same time that the Colledge and Shaftesbury grand
juries exercised a degree of independence from the Crown, other Eng-
lish grand juries began to assume responsibilities beyond their original
role as a criminal accusatory body. The grand jury began to act "as a
sort of 'third estate' of the shire, or county 'House of Commons,' giving
the opinion of the county on matters of public concern . . 29 The
presentment, originally a form of criminal accusation,"0 was adapted by
the grand jury to report publicly on a variety of noncriminal subjects.
The use of the grand jury report expanded over time. English
grand juries in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries used
it to comment on matters of community concern and frequently com-
plained that counties were not properly maintaining bridges and pris-
ons."1 Significantly, reports began to question the conduct of public of-
ficials. 32 The expanding role of the grand jury during this period is
even more thoroughly documented in colonial America, where, in addi-
tion to their accusatory function, "[girand juries acted in the nature of
local assemblies: making known the wishes of the people, proposing
new laws, protesting against abuses in government, performing admin-
istrative tasks, and looking after the welfare of their communities.""
28 See Trial of Stephen Colledge, 8 Howell State Trials 549 (1681) (transcript of
proceedings); The Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 Howell State Trials 759 (1681) (tran-
script of proceedings). The Colledge and Shaftesbury cases are examined in detail in
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 710-21. While the cases have been cited as examples of
how the grand jury can act "as a bulwark against the oppression and despotism of the
Crown," In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 568 (C.D. Cal. 1971), Professor Schwartz con-
cludes that the voluntary exile of Shaftesbury to avoid a pending indictment "epito-
mizes the impotence of the grand jury in the face of a determined exercise of executive
power . . . ." Schwartz, supra note 26, at 719-20.
29 S. WEBB & B. WEBB, supra note 26, at 448.
o See supra note 9.
31 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 148 (1938). Holdsworth
notes that this use of the presentment was apparently so routine that parliament pro-
vided that no money was to be spent on the repair of bridges, jails, prisons, or houses of
correction unless the need was first established by a grand jury presentment. See id.; see
also S. WEBB & D. WEBB, supra note 26, at 448-52 (history of the financial function
of the grand jury). Grand juries also reported that the law requiring signposts at cross-
roads was not being enforced, causing "great inconvenience and damage [to] Her Maj-
esty's liege people." Id. at 454. At times the grand jury's complaint took the form of a
petition to parliament. Id. at 455-56.
12 For instance, a coroner was presented for "vexing" a jury when it failed to
return the verdict he had requested, and several constables were criticized for not en-
forcing laws that regulated the distribution of corn and the control of beggars. See S.
WEBB & D. WEBB, supra note 31, at 453-54.
31 R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634-1941, at 2 (1963). See also L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 14-15, 17
(1975) (discussing the "quasi-legislative" functions performed by colonial grand juries);
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Despite these diverse functions, the primary role of the grand jury
remained its criminal accusatory function. As the common law grand
jury began to develop its shield role, however, it simultaneously ex-
panded its responsibilities in many other directions. One new responsi-
bility was to become a self-appointed citizens' watchdog over govern-
ment. As grand juries turned their attention to the performance of
government, they would discover deficiencies and want to report their
findings publicly. When a grand jury criticized a public official for
causing or tolerating those deficiencies, it was not initiating a prosecu-
tion, but instead ensuring that the official's conduct would come under
public review. Nevertheless, the official was accused of misconduct by
the same body that initiated criminal prosecutions. In the public's
mind, the distinction between a public report that revealed official mis-
conduct and an indictment that initiated a prosecution may have be-
come blurred. The remainder of this Article focuses on whether the
modern grand jury should have the authority to reveal violations of the
public trust without initiating a prosecution.
II. IDENTIFYING THE COMPETING INTERESTS
Grand juries in New Jersey and New York were particularly ac-
In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmis-
sion of Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-23
(D.D.C.) (grand jury is "a great channel of communication between those who make
and administer the laws, and those for whom the laws are made and administered....
They may suggest publick improvements, and the modes of removing publick incon-
veniences: they may expose to publick inspection, or to publick punishment, publick
bad men, and publick bad measures." (citation omitted) (quoting remarks made in
1791 by James Wilson, signer of Declaration of Independence and Constitution and
Supreme Court Justice)), affd sub nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
For example, grand juries in Virginia supervised road construction, Pennsylvania
grand juries inspected public bridges and jails, while their counterparts in Maryland
surveyed land in boundary disputes. See R. YOUNGER, supra, at 11-16. In 1700, a
New Jersey grand jury recommended a head tax on livestock and slaves to pay off the
county debt. Id. at 13. See also In re the Presentment Made to the Superior Court by
the Camden County Grand Jury on or About October 11, 1951, 10 N.J. 23, 41-44, 89
A.2d 416, 427-28 (1952) (giving additional examples of noncriminal reports issued by
colonial New Jersey grand juries). In addition, a New York grand jury in 1681 pro-
posed that the colony be permitted to have an elected assembly. See R. YOUNGER,
supra, at 14; see also J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN COLO-
NIAL NEW YORK 361-63 (1944) (citing additional examples of noncriminal reports
issued by colonial New York grand juries). In Massachusetts a grand jury once ques-
tioned the right of the Governor and his assistants to sell land to certain persons; in
Annapolis a grand jury protested against the refusal of city officials to account for
lottery proceeds and the failure of city council members to attend meetings; and in
Charleston grand juries complained about the disorderly behavior of the town watch
and the failure of city officials to regulate town markets, See R. YOUNGER, supra, at 7,
18.
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tive in issuing public reports during the first half of this century. The
legality of that practice, however, was not decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court until 1952, in In re the Presentment Made to the Supe-
rior Court by the Camden County Grand Jury on or About October
11, 1951," and was only addressed by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in 1961, in Wood v. Hughes." In Camden, the court praised
grand jury reports that identify official misconduct and held that New
Jersey grand juries retained their common law reporting authority. 6 In
Hughes, the court characterized grand jury reports as a threat to indi-
vidual freedom and held that, in the absence of clear statutory authori-
zation, New York grand juries could not reveal official misconduct
other than through an indictment.Y'
This part of the Article identifies and discusses the competing in-
terests implicated by the reporting function and is divided into four sec-
tions. The first two sections review and critique the contrasting judicial
responses of the Camden and Hughes decisions to grand jury reports
that reveal official misconduct that is not subject to prosecution. The
remaining sections discuss two grand jury investigations and reports
that concern criminal misconduct, These reports highlight the issue of
whether a report should be used as an alternative to prosecuting a pub-
lic official for a criminal violation of the public trust. The third section
reviews the grand jury investigation and report that transmitted key
evidence to the House Judiciary Committee concerning President
Nixon's involvement in the Watergate cover-up. In In re Report and
Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmis-
sion of Evidence to the House of Representatives,3 8 District Judge
Sirica decided to transmit the grand jury report to the House Judiciary
Committee. Judge Sirica's reasons for doing so highlight the apparent
differences between the Watergate report and the report reviewed in
the fourth section, the Alaska Impeachment Report.
A. Camden: Highlighting the Public Interest and
the Lack of Forum Objection
The report at issue in Camden resulted from a grand jury investi-
34 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952).
35 9 N.Y.2d 144, 147, 173 N.E.2d 21, 21-22, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (1961), super-
seded by statute as stated in In re Report of August-September, 1983 Grand Jury III,
Term IX, Suffolk County, New York, 103 A.D.2d 176, 479 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1984).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 39-54.
37 See infra text accompanying notes 79-91.




gation into a jail escape."9 At the conclusion of the investigation the
grand jury indicted the undersheriff and several jail guards on charges
of misconduct in office, false swearing, and conspiracy.40 The indict-
ments were accompanied by a report that listed numerous irregularities
in the management of the jail, recommended legislative and administra-
tive changes, and criticized the sheriff for his job performance and lack
of cooperation during the investigation.4 1 The sheriff, who was not in-
dicted, moved to expunge those portions of the report that he argued
were defamatory.4 2 The lower court denied the motion, the sheriff ap-
pealed to the appellate division, and on its own motion the supreme
court removed the case for consideration.4
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Vanderbilt surveyed numerous
reports published by New Jersey grand juries between 1866 and
1932.4 4 The reports touched on virtually every aspect of community life
and provide a rich chronicle of the major concerns of the period. The
reports focused primarily on the quality of governmental services, par-
ticularly those provided by fire and police departments, jails, hospitals,
and asylums.45 The reports typically included findings on the adequacy
of governmental services 46 and, in some cases, proposed laws to address
problems uncovered during the grand jury investigation.47 When the
grand jury found a service to be inadequate, its report offered sugges-
tions for improvement 48 and sometimes criticized public officials for
8 Camden, 10 N.J. at 26, 89 A.2d at 417.
40 Id. at 26, 89 A.2d at 418.
41 Id. at 27-31, 89 A.2d at 418-21.
42 Id. at 31-32, 89 A.2d at 421-22. An official who believes that the grand jury
has acted improperly has two procedures through which to challenge the legality of a
grand jury report. First, the official may sue the members of the grand jury, or even the
district attorney, for libel. The theory behind a libel action is that a grand jury report is
"extra-judicial," and hence not privileged. See Comment, supra note 6, at 713-14. It is
difficult for the public official to prevail in such a case. See Comment, The Propriety of
the Grand Jury Report, 34 TEx. L. REv. 746, 752 (1956).
The most common attack on a grand jury report is a motion to expunge. See
United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 801-04 (5th Cir. 1975) (motion to expunge
name of unindicted coconspirator).
41 Camden, 10 N.J. at 32, 89 A.2d at 422.
44 Id. at 44-59, 89 A.2d at 429-39.
'5 See id.
46 For example, a 1909 report noted the lack of adequate fire fighting equipment
in Newark. See id. at 54, 89 A.2d at 436.
4' For example, a 1905 report concluded that there was a significant number of
false registrations during a recent election and recommended enactment of a registration
law similar to one that had been adopted recently in Pennsylvania. See id. at 49-50, 89
A.2d at 432-33.
48 For example, a 1904 report criticized the ambulance service offered by Newark
and recommended that each private hospital in the city be provided with an ambulance
at public expense. See id. at 49, 89 A.2d at 432.
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their role in creating or tolerating governmental deficiencies."9 Occa-
sionally, the grand jury recommended the removal of the criticized
official.5"
After surveying the history of grand jury reports in New Jersey,
Justice Vanderbilt concluded that the framers of the most recent state
constitution intended to authorize reports concerning "public affairs as
they had been known in New Jersey from earliest colonial times.""1
Turning to the challenged report, he concluded that, since it outlined
irregularities in jail management, it was "so clearly in the public inter-
est that there can be no doubt of the duty of the grand jury to make it
or of the assignment judge to receive and file it."52
Although a portion of the report challenged in Camden was subse-
quently disapproved by the court,53 Chief Justice Vanderbilt's sweep-
9 For example, a 1932 report found that the county board of elections, commis-
sioner of registration, superintendent of elections, and sheriff had failed to safeguard an
election. See id. at 59, 89 A.2d at 439.
50 Three reports issued between 1903 and 1910 show just how broadly New
Jersey grand juries viewed their public reporting function in connection with investiga-
tions into misconduct by public officials. In one report the grand jury concluded that
the superintendent and supervisor of an asylum were guilty of willful neglect of duty,
expressed disapproval at their continued retention, and noted that the statute of limita-
tions prevented it from "taking official cognizance of the nonfeasance and malfeasance
in the management of the asylum." Id. at 55, 89 A.2d at 436. Another report concerned
the grand jury's investigation of a factory fire in which several persons died. The grand
jury criticized the captain of an engine company for not turning in an alarm promptly
and concluded "that the state factory inspector and his superior could not be too
strongly condemned" for not previously reporting conditions that existed at the scene of
the fire. Id. at 57, 89 A.2d at 438. In 1903, a grand jury presented a justice of the
peace for gross violation of his official duties. For a reason not explained in the report,
the grand jury was prevented from returning an indictment. Nevertheless, the report
noted that if the grand jury could have brought criminal charges it would have done so
since the justice of the peace "was guilty of malfeasance in office so vile and scandalous
as to make it a disgrace to the county." Id. at 48, 89 A.2d at 432.
51 Id. at 65, 89 A.2d at 443. The New Jersey Constitution provides that "[n]o
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or
indictment of a grand jury . . . ." N.J. CONST. art..I, § 8. Justice Vanderbilt con-
cluded that the debate on this provision at the Constitutional Convention of 1947 estab-
lished that the drafters, by their reference to presentments, intended to authorize non-
criminal rather than criminal presentments. See Camden, at 64-65, 89 A.2d at 443.
52 Camden, at 68, 89 A.2d at 444-45.
5 In Camden, the grand jury report referred to the sheriff as "a poor witness
whose testimony was evasive and lacking in cooperation" and whose "disinterest and
lack of knowledge of his job . . . rates the strongest kind of moral indictment." Id. at
31-32, 89 A.2d at 421-22 (emphasis omitted). In In re the Presentment Made to the
Superior Court by the Camden County Grand Jury, 1959 Term, First Stated Session,
on or About June 7, 1960, 34 N.J. 378, 169 A.2d 465 (1961), the court disapproved of
this portion of the report, holding that "[a] grand jury transcends its powers when it
reprobates and disparages an individual on the basis of its opinion of the testimony he
gave on appearance before it." Id. at 397, 169 A.2d at 475. The Queens County Court
reached a similar conclusion in In re Lundy, 208 Misc. 833, 846, 148 N.Y.S.2d 658,
669 (Sup. Ct. 1955), holding that deception in grand jury testimony "was not an act of
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ing endorsement of the reporting function continues to be the classic
argument in support of that authority:
If [reports] of matters of public concern were found neces-
sary in the public interest in the relatively simple conditions
of English and colonial life three centuries ago, how much
more essential are they in these days when government at all
levels has taken on a complexity of organization and of oper-
ation that defies the best intentions of the citizen to know
and understand it. What is not known and understood is
likely to be distrusted. What cannot be investigated in a re-
public is likely to be feared. The maintenance of popular
confidence in government requires that there be some body
of laymen which may investigate any instances of public
wrongdoing.
...The grand jury provides a readily available group
of representative citizens of the county empowered, as occa-
sion may demand, to voice the conscience of the community.
There are many official acts and omissions that fall short of
criminal misconduct and yet are not in the public interest. It
is very much to the public advantage that such conduct be
revealed in an effective, official way. No community desires
to live a hairbreadth above the criminal level, which might
well be the case if there were no official organ of public pro-
a public official in the administration of the business of his office" and therefore should
not have been included in a report criticizing the official.
It will be recalled that the Alaska Impeachment Report referred to the Governor's
grand jury testimony as reflecting "extraordinarily poor recollection" and "a lack of
candor and a disrespect for the laws of this state." See ALASKA IMPEACHMENT RE-
PORT, supra note 16, at 13-14. Applying the analysis used in Part III of this Article
for defining the appropriate role of the reporting function, the quoted language in the
Alaska report should not have been included in the report for two alternative reasons.
First, if the grand jury lacked sufficient evidence to indict for perjury, its report should
not have implied that the Governor committed perjury. Second, if the grand jury be-
lieved that it could have indicted the Governor for perjury, it should not have issued a
public report as an alternative to indictment. See infra notes 243-60 and accompanying
text.
However, if a public official's grand jury testimony is evasive or deceptive, but not
to the extent sufficient to support an indictment, a report that revealed the testimony
would alert the public to the possibility that the official may be in violation of the
public trust. Cf Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280, 285 (1968) (noting that public employees are subject to dismissal if they
refuse to account for their performance of a public trust). As long as a report does not
suggest that an official committed perjury before the grand jury, and the grand jury
specifically exonerates the official of criminal misconduct, a report that reveals the offi-
cial's deceptive testimony should be classified as within the appropriate scope of the
reporting function. See infra text accompanying notes 237-42.
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test. Such [reports] are a great deterrent to official wrongdo-
ing. By exposing wrongdoing, moreover, such [reports] in-
spire public confidence in the capacity of the body politic to
purge itself of untoward conditions. 4
1. The Public Interest
Chief Justice Vanderbilt's spirited and eloquent defense of the
grand jury's common law reporting function advances two primary jus-
tifications for its retention. First, the grand jury's ability to investigate
and publicly report on wrongdoing in government exposes government
actions to public scrutiny, and thereby strengthens the democratic sys-
tem. Because the grand jury is a "body of laymen," public confidence
in the accountability of government is enhanced; ordinary citizens can
review its operations. Second, the reporting function ensures that public
officials are held accountable for noncriminal violations of the public
trust by identifying perceived misconduct, thus allowing "the body poli-
tic to purge itself of untoward conditions."55 Although a report cannot
result in the imposition of a criminal sanction, it stimulates public re-
view of the grand jury's findings and may lead to the removal, disci-
pline, or election defeat of the criticized official. The publicity that re-
sults from a report also may deter others from violating the public
trust. The grand jury report can therefore be viewed as a democratic
device furthering the public's right to know about government and
holding public officials accountable for noncriminal violations of the
public trust.5 6
5 Camden, 10 N.J. at 65-66, 89 A.2d at 443-44.
5 Id. at 66, 89 A.2d at 444.
56 Similar reasoning has been followed by other courts upholding the grand jury's
authority to report on the performance of public officials. See, e.g., McClatchy News-
papers v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 598, 604 (Cal. App. 1985) ("The people...
have a basic right to know about the workings of their state and local government
including the activities of public officials in the performance of their official duties.");
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 523 (Fla. 1977) ("A society
governed by representative officials concomitantly requires citizen review of public ac-
tion .... Implicit in the power of the grand jury to investigate and expose official
misconduct is the right of the people to be informed of its findings." (footnotes omit-
ted)); In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 159, 11 So. 2d 316, 319 (1943) (The
grand jury report "is a means whereby the people participate[] directly in" the adminis-
tration of their business . . ... "); In re Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 594, 293 N.Y.S. 584,
597 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ("[lIt is entirely conceivable that public officials, while not guilty
of criminality, may be found to be so lacking in understanding or appreciation of the
duties which are part of their office that a grand jury may be discharging a very high
form of public service if [it] report[s] [its] findings . . ... "). See also Wood v. Hughes,
9 N.Y.2d 144, 161, 173 N.E.2d 21, 30, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 45 (1961) (Desmond, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[Niothing is more hostile to the central spirit of American political philos-
[Vol. 136:73
GRAND JURY REPORTS
Justice Vanderbilt also surveyed alternative methods of investigat-
ing official misconduct and concluded that the grand jury's reporting
function "serve[s] a need that is not met by any other procedure. '57
The legislature, for example, has broad investigatory powers, but he
noted that those powers are infrequently used and seldom examine
problems of local government.58 Entrusting the grand jury with the au-
thority to investigate and report on official misconduct, Justice Vander-
bilt observed, also minimizes the possibility that the official will be un-
justifiably accused because "of the care with which grand juries are
selected, the secrecy with which they deliberate and the judicial control
of such [reports] when they are handed to the court."59
Justice Vanderbilt's conception of the grand jury was of an inde-
pendent "people's panel" functioning outside of government.60 Today's
grand jury, however, is more often characterized as an institution domi-
nated by the prosecutor or as an arm of the court.6 More accurately,
ophy than to allow any public officer to suppress and bury a relevant, nonscandalous
commentary on public affairs by an authorized body of citizens."), superseded by stat-
ute as stated in In re Report of the August-September, 1983 Grand Jury III, Term
IX, Suffolk County, New York, 103 A.D.2d 176, 479 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1984).
" Camden, 10 N.J. at 66, 89 A.2d at 443. Additional support for the view that
the grand jury is better equipped than other institutions to investigate official miscon-
duct appears in Kuh, supra note 6, at 1118-20 (pointing out that no overseer exists to
guarantee that legislative or executive committees act fairly while conducting investiga-
tions); Note, supra note 17, at 305-06 (grand juries freer from political concerns than
legislature and executive committees). See also 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note
24, at § 8.3(g) (stating that grand jury investigations quell public suspicions of partisan
influences).
5 Camden, 10 N.J. at 65, 89 A.2d at 443.
" Id. at 67, 89 A.2d at 444.
" The "people's panel" characterization of the grand jury appears in the title of
Younger's study of the history of the grand jury in the United States. See R. YOUNGER,
supra note 33; see also In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 269 (7th
Cir. 1956) ("[Wlhen exercising its traditional functions [the grand jury] possesses an
independence which is unique. Its authority is derived from none of the three basic
divisions of our government, but rather directly from the people themselves."); In re
Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of
Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D.D.C.) (empha-
sizing that the grand jury may act independently of any branch of government and
pursue investigations without the consent or participation of the prosecutor), affd sub
nom. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974); In re Subpoena to Nixon,
360 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C.) ("The grand jury derives its authority directly from the
people, and when that group, independent in its sphere, acts according to its mandate,
the court cannot justifiably withhold its assistance . . . ." (citations omitted)), modi-
fied, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"1 See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960) (stating that "[tihe grand
jury is an arm of the court"); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, 381 F.
Supp. 519, 521-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (discussing the prosecutor's dominance of the
grand jury proceedings); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973) (discussing a concern for the continued viability of the
grand jury because of its subservience to the court apd prosecutor); Lewis, The Grand
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the grand jury operates in a manner somewhere between these two
views. Although exercising a degree of independence from executive
domination and judicial control, the grand jury is ultimately dependent
on government if it is to perform its functions.62 Even if the grand jury
is an integral part of government, the reporting function can be viewed
as a device that forces government to police itself. Public confidence in
the accountability of government is then furthered by requiring govern-
ment to identify its own misconduct.
In one respect, the public interest served by grand jury reports
furthers values similar to those protected by applying the New York
Times63 rule to defamation actions brought by public officials. If there
is a strong public interest in protecting vigorous debate about the con-
duct of public officials,6 there is an equally compelling public interest
in learning of official misconduct uncovered by a grand jury. 5 On the
other hand, the catalyst for the public debate furthered by the New
York Times rule, the press, is a nongovernmental source that can claim
first amendment protection for its speech. The weight to be accorded
the first amendment interest furthered by a report, however, is less sub-
stantial than that furthered by the New York Times rule, since the
grand jury is at least partially dependent on government to fulfill its
functions, 6 and the extent of first amendment protection accorded gov-
ernmental speech is problematic.6"
Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L. REV. 33, 57 (1979) (stating that the grand
jury is an "arm of the executive").
" See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974) (noting that the
grand jury must rely on the court to compel production of books, documents, papers,
and the testimony of witnesses); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (not-
ing that the grand jury is "powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses"),
overruled on other grounds, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
65 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court
held that the first amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
64 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
15 See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 209 Cal Rptr. 598, 604 (Cal.
App. 1985) ("[Tlhe people of California have a basic right to know about the workings
of their state and local government including the activities of public officials in the'
performance of their official duties."); see also Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2 (arguing for a first amendment right of access
to information). But see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2739-
2741 (1986) (first amendment right of access to information only when "place and
process [of criminal proceedings] has historically been open to the press and general
public" and when "public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question").
66 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67 Arguably, the purpose of the first amendment is to function only as a limitation
on governmental power, not as a source of governmental rights. See M. YUDOF, WHEN
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Moreover, to further the first amendment interest of encouraging
debate on public issues, the New York Times rule accepts the conse-
quence that some unjustified attacks on reputation will go uncompen-
sated under state libel standards.68 The harm to an official's reputation,
however, is likely to be substantially greater when a defamatory false-
hood appears in an official grand jury document released by a court
than when the falsehood is expressed in ordinary public debate.69 The
public interest in learning of official misconduct may not outweigh the
interest of the official in protecting her reputation from possibly un-
founded allegations if the accuser is publicly perceived as government
and the official is denied an opportunity to respond to the grand jury's
charges.
2. The Lack of Forum Objection
While Camden highlights the public interest furthered by reports
that identify official misconduct, Justice Vanderbilt gave little consider-
ation to the competing interests of the official criticized in the report.
Justice Vanderbilt acknowledged that the primary objection to a report
is that it fails to provide a forum for response,70 but he did not consider
that concern sufficient to abolish the reporting function. Noting that
other grand jury actions could also be criticized for failing to provide a
forum for response,"1 Justice Vanderbilt discounted the need for a fo-
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA
44 n.28 (1983) (authority for proposition that several amendments in the Bill of Rights
have not been extended to governmental bodies); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's
Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1153 (1979) (argu-
ing that the first amendment contains an implied prohibition against governmental ad-
vocacy of political viewpoints); Van Alystyne, The First Amendment and the Suppres-
sion of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530, 531-37 (1966) (arguing that the first amendment lim-
its government propaganda). But see Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35
STAN. L. REV. 373, 385 (1983) (arguing that limiting government speech is inconsis-
tent with the marketplace of ideas); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy
in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535, 541 (1980) (suggesting
some basis for arguing that the first amendment protects municipal speech).
65 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).
69 See In re Grand Jury, 271 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Minn. 1978) ("The judicial
imprimatur under which a grand jury operates gives to its pronouncements a ring of
proven truth which they may not deserve."); Simington v. Shimp, 60 Ohio App. 2d
402, 407-08, 398 N.E.2d 812, 816 (1978) ("any attempt by a named individual to
rebut the contents of the report would not have, in the public's mind, the same 'official
weight' as the report's original accusation").
70 Camden, 10 N.J. at 66, 89 A.2d at 444.
71 Id. at 67-68, 89 A.2d at 444. As one example, Justice Vanderbilt noted that
many indictments are never brought to trial. See, e.g., Judge Drops Election Case
Against Fiedler and Aide, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at A18, col. 1 (court dismissed
indictment); California Prosecutor Won't Pursue Case Against Rep. Fiedler, N.Y.
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rum to refute a report's charges of misconduct. The care with which
grand jurors are selected and the ability of the court to refuse to file a
report that appears false minimize the possibility that the grand jury's
accusations will be unfounded. 2 Since the report's charges are likely
accurate, Justice Vanderbilt was not very troubled by the lack of forum
objection.
Justice Vanderbilt's response to the lack of forum objection is less
than satisfying. The public official's lack of a forum to respond to a
critical report jeopardizes the basic fairness of the reporting function. 3
Despite the best judicial efforts to ensure the accuracy of a report
before release, the grand jury may publish a false report and the offi-
cial would be denied a judicial forum in which to refute the allegations
contained in the report.
Moreover, the issuance of a grand jury report will not provide an
adequate alternative, nonjudicial forum for response in every case, as
Justice Vanderbilt had intimated. On the one hand, public officials are
likely to have easy access to the media and can use that access to re-
spond to a report.74 Moreover, by voluntarily attaining office, public
Times, Feb. 20, 1986, at A14, col. 1 (prosecutor refused to oppose a motion seeking
dismissal of a grand jury indictment).
2 Camden, 10 N.J. at 67, 89 A.2d at 444.
7' Reports that reveal violations of the public trust can be challenged as violating
procedural due process for failing to provide a mechanism for officials to protect their
reputations from unfounded governmental accusations. The only state court case that
considers the constitutionality of the reporting function under a due process analysis is
In re Second Report of the November, 1968, Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d 200, 257 N.E.2d
859, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1970), in which the court held that New York's statute that
authorizes and regulates the reporting function satisfied the due process clause of the
state constitution. The court noted that the statute allows a public official to file an
answer to a report before publication and interpreted the statute to permit the official
to inspect the grand jury minutes in preparing that answer. Id. at 204-05, 257 N.E.2d
at 861, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 299-301. The New York reporting statute is discussed in
greater detail infra at text accompanying notes 95-110.
A comprehensive analysis of the due process issues raised by the reporting function
appears in a recently published treatise on the grand jury. See 1 S. BEALE & W.
BRYSON, supra note 7, § 3.04. After reviewing the leading Supreme Court procedural
due process cases, the authors conclude that a reporting procedure providing a public
official with the opportunity to appear before the grand jury and to attach a response to
a critical report complies with due process requirements. Although the authors ac-
knowledge that it presents a "slightly more difficult question," id., they conclude that a
reporting function not including these features also withstands due process analysis if
the official can challenge a report before publication. The authors' due process analysis,
however, is based on the assumption that a report reveals noncriminal misconduct. See
id. Potential due process challenges to reports that reveal criminal misconduct are sug-
gested infra at note 124.
71 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring) (1967) (public officials have "ready access .. . to mass media . . . to counter
criticism of their views and activities"); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 344 (1973) (public officials have "access to the channels of effective communica-
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officials assume an increased risk of scrutiny"6 and subject themselves to
a standard of conduct more demanding than that required by the crimi-
nal law.7 6
On the other hand, a public official's career depends on a positive
reputation, which could be permanently damaged by a critical report.
Although an official can respond to a report through the media, vindi-
cation in the public forum can never be as complete as vindication re-
sulting from a judicial or other governmental determination that the
official has not violated the public trust. ' Nine years after Camden,
the New York Court of Appeals, in Wood v. Hughes,78 relied on the
lack of forum objection to hold that New York grand juries no longer
retained the authority to report on official misconduct.
B. Hughes: Challenging the Public Interest and
Highlighting the Competing Interests of the Public Official
The disputed report in Hughes criticized practices of a county
highway department as "contrary to the general interests of the pub-
lic.179 Although the grand jury did not identify the responsible officials,
the court of appeals noted that the report left "little doubt as to their
identity."80 The justice presiding over the grand jury refused to release
the report except for a single paragraph which did not concern the
highway department."1 The grand jury foreman unsuccessfully peti-
tioned the appellate division to order the report's release and the New
York Court of Appeals accepted review.82
In Camden, Chief Justice Vanderbilt gave substantial weight to
New Jersey's long history of grand jury reports in holding that the
tion" and are therefore in a better position than a private person in countering harm to
reputation from a defamatory falsehood made in public debate).
" Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. See also RAYNER, LIFE OF JEFFERSON 356 (Boston ed.
1832), in II J. FOLEY, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA § 8596, at 887 (1900)
("When a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself as public
property.").
71 See supra note I and accompanying text.
7 See Simington v. Shimp, 60 Ohio App. 2d 402, 407-08, 398 N.E.2d 812, 816
(1978); Golladay, Sidestepping Due Process: Federal Grand Juries and the
Unindicted Co-Conspirator, 65 JUDICATURE 363, 368 (1982) (describing the concept
of defending oneself in the media as "a rather novel means of legal defense!").
78 9 N.Y.2d 144, 154-56, 173 N.E.2d 21, 26-27, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 40-41 (1961),
superseded by statute as stated in In re Report of the August-September, 1983 Grand
Jury III, Term IX, Suffolk County, New York, 103 A.D.2d 176, 479 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1984).
79 Id. at 148, 173 N.E.2d at 22, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
80 Id.
81 Id. That paragraph concerned windows in the county jail.
82 Id. at 148, 173 N.E.2d at 22-23, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
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modern grand jury retained its common law reporting function. 3 In
contrast, Judge Fuld, writing in Hughes for a four-to-three majority of
the court of appeals, dismissed the past reporting practices of New
York grand juries as irrelevant84 and held that grand juries could no
longer issue reports criticizing noncriminal misconduct by public offi-
cials.8 5 Judge Fuld found that the grand jury's common law authority
had been supplanted by comprehensive legislative regulation and that,
the reporting function was not authorized either by state statute or the
state constitution. 6 Judge Fuld acknowledged that the legislature could
restore the reporting function by a clear grant of authority,8 but his
characterization of reports that identify official misconduct made it
clear he was not recommending that action:
In the public mind, accusation by report is indistin-
guishable from accusation by indictment and subjects those
against whom it is directed to the same public condemnation
and opprobrium as if they had been indicted. An indictment
charges a violation of a known and certain public law and is
but the first step in a long process in which the accused may
seek vindication through exercise of the right to a public
trial, to a jury, to counsel, to confrontation of witnesses
against him and, if convicted, to an appeal. A report, on the
contrary, based as it is upon the grand jury's own criteria of
public or private morals, charges the violation of subjective
and unexpressed standards of morality and is the first and
last step of the judicial process. It is at once an accusation
and a final condemnation, and, emanating from a judicial
83 See supra text accompanying note 54.
84 Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at 154-55, 173 N.E.2d at 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The activ-
ism of New Jersey grand juries in exercising a public reporting function was matched
by grand juries in New York. By 1961, approximately 500 reports had been filed in
Manhattan alone. See id. at 156-57, 173 N.E.2d at 27-28, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 42
(Desmond, C.J., dissenting). Like the New Jersey reports, the New York reports con-
cerned a wide variety of community concerns and occasionally revealed official miscon-
duct. See Kuh, supra note 6, at 1104 & n.5 (citing seven reports issued by four differ-
ent New York City grand juries in 1954 within a nine-week period).
Grand jury reports were frequently challenged in New York before Hughes. In In
re Jones, 101 A.D. 55, 92 N.Y.S. 275, appeal dismissed, 181 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226
(1905), the only appellate decision before Hughes, the appellate division upheld a re-
port that censured a county board of supervisors and two of its clerks. The lower courts
in New York, however, were divided on whether grand juries could issue reports that
identify official misconduct, with most adopting the view of the dissent in Jones and
holding that the grand jury lacked that authority. See Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at 148 & n.2,
173 N.E.2d at 22 & n.2, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 35 & n.2.
88 Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at 155-56, 173 N.E.2d at 27, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 40-41.
88 Id. at 149-51, 173 N.E.2d at 23-26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 36-39.
87 See infra text accompanying note 91.
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body occupying a position of respect and importance in the
community, its potential for harm is incalculable.88
Although Judge Fuld was highly critical of the reporting function,
he readily embraced the principles that public officials should be held
to a high standard of behavior and that "criticism of the conduct of
public office is part of the very lifeblood of our democracy."8" The
grand jury report, he argued, is ill-suited to further those objectives.
The secrecy that surrounds grand jury deliberations and the immunity
that protects grand jurors creates a "grave danger that grand jury re-
ports may as readily be used as instruments of unfair partisan politics
as of public enlightenment." 90 Accordingly, Judge Fuld concluded that
the issue raised by a report
is not the integrity of a public official or his performance in
office, but rather the process or procedure to be employed in
charging and judging him. To be deplored, and avoided in
the absence of a clear grant of legislative authority, is not
public criticism of officials, but criticism contained in a court
report which, while it carries, at least, the aura of a judicial
pronouncement, denies to the persons involved any of those
safeguards designed to protect against the violation of cher-
ished individual rights.9"
If Camden presents the classic argument in support of the grand
jury's reporting authority, Hughes undoubtedly advances the definitive
counterarguments. Judge Fuld's objections to reports that identify offi-
cial misconduct reflect two primary concerns. The first focuses on the
possible abuse of the reporting function and the second on the public's
inability to distinguish between accusation by report and accusation by
indictment.
1. Abuse of the Reporting Function: New York's Response
Judge Fuld, unlike Justice Vanderbilt, feared that the nature of
the grand jury process, coupled with a vague standard for official mis-
conduct, would create a "grave danger" that the reporting authority
could be used for purposes other than public enlightenment.92 The dan-
ger of abuse arises because the grand jury's findings need not be estab-
88 Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at 154, 173 N.E.2d at 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40.
89 Id. at 156, 173 N.E.2d at 27, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
90 Id. at 155, 173 N.E.2d at 27, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
91 Id. at 156, 173 N.E.2d at 27, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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lished in an adversarial proceeding9" and the official may never com-
pletely vindicate himself by publicly refuting false charges.
If the reporting process creates a substantial danger of abuse, the
public interest furthered by reports is diminished. Rather than being
used to support democracy by exposing governmental misconduct, re-
ports could be used for political ends to harass public officials with
false charges."' By implicitly challenging Justice Vanderbilt's charac-
terization of the public interest furthered by the reporting function,
Judge Fuld reduced the significance of that interest and gave greater
weight to the interests of the official criticized by the grand jury.
A grand jury or prosecutor may be tempted to abuse the reporting
authority as Judge Fuld feared. If, however, one can minimize the pos-
sibility of abuse and create forums to allow a response by the official,
the potential for abuse need not defeat the legitimate use of the grand
jury report to further the public interest. For example, two years after
Hughes, the New York legislature authorized grand juries to report on
"misconduct, non-feasance or neglect in public office by a public ser-
vant as the basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary ac-
tion."9 5 At the same time, it comprehensively regulated the reporting
" Many of the procedural protections of trial are not present in grand jury pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345-52 (1974) (evidence
inadmissible at trial is permitted in grand jury); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 363 (1956) (hearsay evidence is admissible in grand jury); Hammond v. Brown,
323 F. Supp. 326, 338 (N.D. Ohio) (witness before grand jury not entitled to have
attorney present), affd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971).
"' See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 183, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4078 (statement of Rep. Conyers) (concern about
smear campaigns voiced in House Debate in opposition to federal reporting statute).
95 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(1)(a) (McKinney 1982). The New York
statute served as a model for federal legislation that authorized special grand juries
investigating organized crime conditions to issue public reports "concerning noncrimi-
nal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance in office involving organized criminal ac-
tivity by an appointed public officer or employee as the basis for a recommendation of
removal or disciplinary action." 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). In
arguing against passage of the Organized Crime Control Act, which included the fed-
eral reporting statute, Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan compared grand jury
reports to "sanctified calumny" and invited supporters of the bill to "first ponder why
the Senate version of this bill was amended by the House committee to exclude elected
officials from the reach of these mini-star chambers." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 182, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4078.
When the House considered passage of the Organized Crime Control Act, Repre-
sentative McCulloch explained why the House Judiciary Committee amended the Sen-
ate version of the bill to limit the reporting authority to reports that concern appointed
public officers and employees:
The limitation has two purposes. The first is to keep the special grand
jury from "playing politics." Some members of the committee feared that a
special grand jury might be tempted to abuse its power by trying to influ-
ence the outcome of an election.
The second purpose of the limitation is to protect further this grant of
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process to prevent the abuses that concerned Judge Fuld.
The key provision of New York's statutory scheme mandates judi-
cial review of a report before publication. For the report to be accepted
for filing as a public record, the court that impaneled the grand jury
must determine that the report's findings are supported by a prepon-
derance of legally admissible evidence9" and that the official was af-
forded the opportunity to testify before the grand jury.9" If these condi-
power to the special grand jury from attack on grounds that it violates the
due process clause. Some have criticized this provision in the Senate bill as
granting the special grand jury what is in effect the power to indict with-
out according the identified individual the opportunity for vindication. The
phrase-as the basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary ac-
tion-did not make sense when applied to instances of elected officials
such as mayors or governors. To whom would the recommendation be
made? The people? Who had the authority to remove or discipline such
an official? If no such power to remove or discipline existed, was the spe-
cial grand jury yet authorized to issue the report?
The answers to such questions become evident when the reporting
power is limited to appointed officers and employees. Then the report may
be viewed as a recommendation to the appointing agency to remove or to
discipline. The identified individual thus has a further recourse. He may
present his case anew to the appointing agency. He will have an opportu-
nity to vindicate his position. The analogy to an indictment without a trial
is no longer valid.
116 CONG. REc. 35,198 (1970) (remarks of Rep. McCulloch).
Representative Eckhart was not persuaded by this explanation and offered an
amendment to restore the reporting authority over elected public officials, as it had
appeared in the Senate bill. See id. at 35,329-32 (remarks of Rep. Eckhart). Represen-
tative Eckhart argued that "all public officers, including elected officials, should be
included if anyone is to be included," and that the "elected mayor, sheriff, or Congress-
man, has a stump from which to speak" to the charges but that the nonelected public
employee did not. Id. at 35,330. Echoing these concerns, Representative Koch predicted
that the public would view the House's limitation as "meaning the Members of Con-
gress[] are willing to tell others what they shall do . . . but that we the Congress, in
our own protection and to protect every other public official, are not willing to be
governed by the same restrictions." Id. at 35,331 (remarks of Rep. Koch). Koch also
noted that the lack of forum objection to grand jury reports was even less persuasive
when applied to an elected official since, the official "generally has a forum from which
to defend himself, whereas the appointed official often does not." Id.
Representative Eckhart's amendment was rejected by the House. Id. at 35,332.
The Senate ultimately accepted the House changes to the bill, id. at 35,296, but Sena-
tor McClellan, one of the act's original sponsors, referred to the House exemption of
elected officials as "the most weakening amendment [to the bill] passed by the House."
Id. at 36,293 (statement of Sen. McClellan).
96 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(2)(a) (McKinney 1982). Compare 18
U.S.C. § 3333(b)(1) (1982) (requiring a report to be supported by a preponderance of
the evidence without requiring that the evidence be legally admissible) with N.J. R.
CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(c) (before "a public official is censured [in a report] the proof must
be conclusive that the existence of the condemned matter is inextricably related to non-
criminal failure to discharge his public duty" (emphasis added)).
97 N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 190.85(2)(b) (McKinney 1982); accord 18 U.S.C.
§ 3333(b)(2) (1982) (before report is accepted for filing the official and witnesses in
official's behalf must have been afforded an opportunity to testify). But see N.J. R.
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tions are met, the report must then be temporarily sealed and served on
the official, who can file a defense to the grand jury's findings." In
framing the defense, the official is allowed access to the grand jury
minutes.9" If the court releases the report over the objection of the offi-
cial, the official's defense must be included as an appendix to the re-
port."'0 The official has the right to appeal a decision to release the
report and the report remains sealed while the appeal is pending. 0'
This approach to regulating the reporting function accomplishes
several objectives and responds directly to the leading criticisms of
grand jury reports that reveal official misconduct. First, prepublication
review creates a judicial forum and an appeal procedure for the official
to challenge a report before release and, along with the requirement
that the official be afforded an opportunity to testify before the grand
jury, likely removes any procedural due process objections to the report-
ing function.' 2 Second, the possibility that the grand jury will use a
report to knowingly bring false or reckless charges is reduced since the
report must be submitted to the court and served on the criticized offi-
cial for review before publication.'0 3 Third, the concern that the secrecy
that surrounds the grand jury process will encourage abuse is ad-
dressed, since the official can review the grand jury proceedings that led
CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(c) (no requirement that official have chance to testify).
98 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(3) (McKinney 1982); accord 18 U.S.C.
§ 3333(c)(1)-(2) (1982) (largely identical to New York provision); N.J. R. CRIM.
PRAC. 3:6-9(c) (official has 10 days to file a motion to dispute the report).
9 See In re Second Report of the November, 1968 Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d 200,
204-05, 257 N.E.2d 859, 860-61, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299-300 (1970); see also N.J. R.
CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(c) (official can fully examine the grand jury minutes under court
supervision). When the grand jury issues a report that reveals a violation of the public
trust, traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy are no longer compelling. See In
re the Presentment Made to the Superior Court by the Camden County Grand Jury,
1959 Term, First Stated Session, on or About June 7, 1960, 34 N.J. 378, 401, 169
A.2d 465, 477 (1961) (veil of secrecy of proceedings not sacrosanct).
100 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(3) (McKinney 1982). Portions of the de-
fense that the court determines "to be scandalously or prejudicially and unnecessarily
inserted therein" can be excluded. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3333(c)(2) (1982) (court
shall include official's defense as an appendix to the report). The New Jersey court
rule that regulates the reporting function does not authorize the court to include an
official's defense as an appendix to the report. N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(c).
101 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.90(1), (4) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987).
See also N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(d) (judge must delay publication pending hearing).
Although the right to appeal release decisions under the federal reporting statute is not
specifically provided for, appeals were clearly contemplated. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3333(c)(1)(ii) (1982) (court shall delay releasing report during pendency of appeal).
102 See supra note 73.
103 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(1)-(3) (McKinney 1982). In California, as
an added deterrent to abuse, the immunity generally protecting grand jurors can be
removed if a report that contains false charges is made knowingly or recklessly without
bringing indictment. See CALIF. PENAL CODE § 930 (West 1985) (removing the grand
jurors' immunity whenever a report comments on a person who has not been indicted).
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to the report."" Fourth, the likelihood that the grand jury's charges are
accurate is increased since release depends on a judicial determination
that the report is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
10 5
Fifth, by requiring release of the official's defense with the report,10 6
New York ensures the official's access to the public forum simultane-
ously with the report's publication and mitigates the perception of a
report as a "foul blow" that allows no opportunity for a response. Fi-
nally, a report must recommend the removal or discipline of an official
criticized for misconduct.107 Publication of the report may therefore
prompt the initiation of an adversarial proceeding in which the public
official can respond to the grand jury's charges.1 08
Regulating the reporting function to this degree provides the pub-
lic official with greater protection from possible abuse of the grand jury
process than if the official had been indicted. 09 The court can block an
unsubstantiated report from being published, while the official cannot
challenge an indictment until it is returned. 10 Prepublication judicial
review minimizes the possibility that the reporting function will be
abused, and, if it is, judicial review prevents the report from being
released.
New York's regulatory scheme also provides a public official with
opportunities to respond to a grand jury's charges of misconduct. The
most effective forum is the official's ability to object to a report during
prepublication judicial review and to prevent release of unjustified find-
ings. If the report is published, the official's defense, attached as an
104 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108 The federal reporting statute also requires that a report serve as the basis for
the grand jury's recommendation that disciplinary or removal proceedings be initiated
but only authorizes reports concerning misconduct by appointed public officers or em-
ployees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a)(1) (1982); supra note 95.
'09 See Weinstein & Shaw, Grand Jury Reports-A Safeguard of Democracy,
1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 191, 204 (grand jury reports offer a fairer and more effective
investigatory forum than an indictment because of the "judicial controls" inherent in
the process). But see H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 183, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4078-79 (statement of Rep. Conyers) (argu-
ing that federal reporting statute, which provides procedural safeguards similar to New
York statute, offers "illusory" protections for public officials).
Whether the New York safeguards should apply to the reporting function was
challenged in In re Second Report of the November, 1968 Grand Jury, 26 N.Y.2d 200,
218, 257 N.E.2d 859, 869, 309 N.Y.S.2d 297, 311 (Breitel, J., dissenting) ("The most
shocking discrimination, however, is that criminal defendants, with so much more at
stake, have no protection or 'due process' similar to that being accorded to public of-
ficers and employees who are being criticized with less than crime.").
110 Most courts hold that indictments are not even subject to the challenge thit the
evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to indict. See infra note 236.
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appendix, ensures access to the public forum. Finally, if a disciplinary
or removal proceeding is triggered by the report, the official can re-
spond effectively to the grand jury's accusation of misconduct in an ad-
versarial proceeding.
2. Distinguishing Between Reports and Indictments
The preceding discussion suggests that the reporting function can
be regulated to minimize the possibility of abuse. Given the strong pub-
lic interest in revealing violations of the public trust, combined with the
ability to protect an official's reputation from unjustified grand jury
accusations, one might conclude that the grand jury should have the
authority to report on official misconduct. The discussion to this point,
however, does not respond to Judge Fuld's second objection to the re-
porting function: the public's inability to distinguish between accusa-
tions by report and those by indictment."' A discussion of that objec-
tion raises the difficult issue of which violations of the public trust can
be revealed by a report and which violations should be revealed only by
an indictment.
a. The Source of the Problem and the New Jersey Solution
Public confusion about the significance of a report's accusation of
misconduct may be traced to a grand jury's uncertainty as to whether
the misconduct is indictable, or to a prosecutor's uncertainty as to
whether the misconduct is sufficient to obtain a conviction. Such uncer-
tainties can arise from two possible sources: quantitative and qualitative
evidentiary problems.1 2 To illustrate each, recall the hypothetical
posed in the introduction to the Article concerning the public official
who takes a discretionary action to benefit a campaign contributor. 3
Expanding upon the hypothetical, assume that the contributor made a
substantial contribution to the official's election campaign the day
before the official acted favorably to the contributor and that the contri-
bution was reported to the state election commission as required by
law.
Quantitative evidentiary problems concern whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to establish the elements of a crime. For example, in the
bribe receiving hypothetical, the prosecution may be unable to establish
that the official received a contribution as a quid pro quo for an action
111 See supra text accompanying note 88.
12 I am grateful to my colleague Arthur Leavens for suggesting this distinction.
11 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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favoring the contributor. In turn, this lack of quantitatively sufficient
evidence can cause the prosecution to fail at either of two points: at the
indictment stage, or at the conviction stage. Each stage involves a differ-
ent standard of proof. An indictment requires that the evidence before
the grand jury establish probable cause or a prima facie case that the
defendant committed a crime,""4 while a conviction requires that the
defendant's guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
11 5
Unlike quantitative evidentiary problems, qualitative evidentiary
problems concern whether the evidence, regardless of its strength, can
establish the defendant's criminal liability as a matter of law. For ex-
ample, assume that the issue of whether a reported campaign contribu-
tion is a benefit under the bribe receiving statute has not been ad-
dressed in the jurisdiction."' If the official is indicted on the theory
that the campaign contribution establishes the receipt of a benefit, the
indictment may be challenged by a motion to dismiss." 7 A reported
campaign contribution may not be, as a matter of law, the type of evi-
dence that can ever establish that a benefit was received under the
statute.
If the grand jury issues a report as an alternative to a prosecution
presenting evidentiary problems, whether quantitative or qualitative," 8
114 The United States Supreme Court has frequently referred to a probable cause
standard as the quantum of proof required to support an indictment. See Vasquez v.
Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 623 (1986); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972). Federal courts differ, how-
ever, in their definitions of that standard for the grand jury. See Arenella, Reforming
the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction
Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 485-87 (1980) (some courts and the
Department of Justice equate the probable cause standard to indict with the probable
cause standard to arrest, whereas other courts follow a more rigorous "probability-of-
conviction" probable cause standard).
Standards that govern prosecutorial discretion refer to a probable cause or prima
facie evidence standard as the minimum level of proof required to initiate criminal
charges. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1983)
(prosecutor shall "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause"); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNC-
TION § 3.9(e) & Commentary (Approved Draft 1971) (standard requires the prosecu-
tor to only bring charges that "he can reasonably support with evidence at trial," and
commentary equates standard with prima facie evidence test); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION B.l.(a) & Comment (1980) (prose-
cutor may not institute charges without "probable cause to believe that a person has
committed a federal offense").
116 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
116 Several states preclude an official's conviction for receiving such a contribution.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.130 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.005(1) (1985).
117 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b). This may occur because the charge fails to allege
a necessary element of the crime. Cf. United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th
Cir. 1981) (court characterized defendant's appeal of RICO conviction as an attack
upon the indictment for failure to charge an offense).
118 This distinction between quantitative and qualitative evidentiary problems is
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and the report contains ambiguous language relating to evidentiary suf-
ficiency, the public may be unable to distinguish between accusation by
report and accusation by indictment. Rather than risk an unsuccessful
prosecution, the grand jury may prepare a report that reveals the offi-
cial's violation of the public trust. Since the official's misconduct may
also have been indictable, and perhaps even sufficient to establish the
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, readers might view the
report as a criminal accusation.
New Jersey's approach to regulating the reporting function pro-
vides one response to alleviating the concern that accusation by indict-
ment and by report are indistinguishable. New Jersey reports may only
be issued to censure a public official for "non-criminal" misconduct."i 9
As part of a report's prepublication judicial review, the court must de-
termine whether "it appears that a crime has been committed for which
an indictment may be had."12 The court must strike any portion. that
appears to accuse a public official of a crime,1" 1 and a report may not
be published if the evidence before the grand jury was indictable. 22
This approach responds to Judge Fuld's concern. Public confusion
about the significance of a report is likely to be greatest when the grand
concededly arbitrary. Insufficient quantitative evidence to establish an element of a
crime, for example, may be viewed as lacking either the quantity or the quality re-
quired to support an indictment or a conviction. Regardless of the label of the eviden-
tiary problem, however, the discussion illustrates general categories of evidentiary issues
in a grand jury investigation of possible criminal misconduct.
119 N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:6-9(c). The federal reporting statute also limits the
reporting authority to revelations of noncriminal misconduct. See supra note 95. When
the House debated the federal statute, Representative Eckhart proposed an amendment
authorizing reports "concerning misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance in office,
whether or not itself criminal." 116 CONG. REC. 35,329 (1970) (statement of Rep.
Eckhart) (emphasis added). Eckhart argued that this amendment was required to pre-
vent "a very artificial procedure in which a person could say 'because I engaged in a
crime, you cannot make a report about me.'" Id. at 35,330. Representative Poff re-
sponded that since a grand jury had the power to indict or report, "it would be inap-
propriate in the extreme for a jury assembled to make a report charging criminal con-
duct and fail to indict." Id. at 35,331 (statement of Rep. Poff). Representative
Eckhart's amendment was defeated by the House. Id. at 35,332.
120 N.J. R. CRIM. PRAc. 3:6-9(c). In making that determination, the court is au-
thorized to examine the grand jury minutes. Id.
121 See In re the Presentment Made to the Superior Court by the Camden County
Grand Jury, 1959 Term, First Stated Session, on or About June 7, 1960, 34 N.J. 378,
393, 169 A.2d 465, 473 (1961); see also supra note 20.
122 In re Investigation into Hamilton Township Bd. of Educ., 205 N.J. Super.
248, 250, 500 A.2d 744, 745 (App. Div. 1985) ("Prior to [preparing a report] censur-
ing a public official for abuse of his office, the Grand Jury must resolve that the evi-
dence before it is insufficient or lacking for a criminal indictment against him for the
same wrongdoing."); In re Presentment of Essex County Grand Jury, 110 N.J. Super.
24, 28, 264 A.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 1970) (The grand jury may not replace a report
for an indictment and the report "may censure a public official for some nonindictable
conduct on his part." (emphasis omitted)); see also supra note 22.
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jury reveals conduct that may establish a crime or its report otherwise
suggests a criminal violation of the public trust. If the release of such
reports is blocked by prepublication judicial review, public confusion
about the reporting function can be reduced. At the same time, prohib-
iting reports that reveal indictable misconduct coincides with Justice
Vanderbilt's sweeping praise of the reporting function as a device that
holds public officials accountable for "official acts and omissions that
fall short of criminal misconduct and yet are not in the public inter-
est."12 If the misconduct is indictable, the public interest in reviewing
the actions of public officials and holding them accountable for viola-
tions of the public trust would be served by an indictment. The subse-
quent prosecution would reveal the misconduct, and protect the official
from an unjustified criminal accusation by providing the procedural
safeguards of a criminal trial. 24
b. Problems with the New Jersey Solution
Prohibiting the reporting function when a violation of the public
trust is indictable, the New Jersey solution, does not always serve the
interests of the public or the public official. To illustrate, assume in the
hypothetical bribery investigation that although the quid pro quo ele-
ment can probably be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial,
there is also a substantial possibility that the official will be acquitted.
Fearful of the negative publicity that may result from an acquittal, the
123 Camden, 10 N.J. at 66, 89 A.2d at 444; see supra text accompanying note 54.
124 The use of a report to accuse a public official of criminal misconduct may also
be subject to constitutional challenge as a violation of due process and the fifth amend-
ment right to indictment. Cf. United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir.
1975) (naming of private persons as unindicted coconspirators exceeds the grand jury's
authority and violates the procedural due process rights of those named); In re Jordan,
439 F. Supp. 199, 208 (S.D. W. Va. 1977) (naming of a private person as an
unindicted coconspirator violates "his due process right to be permitted the protection of
the federal indictment process as it is secured to him under the Fifth Amendment and
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."). But cf. Note, Federal Grand Juries May
Not Name Unindicted Coconspirators, 54 TEx. L. REv. 663, 672 (1976) ("When the
grand jury, desiring to indict an individual, accedes to the prosecutor's request to name
the individual an unindicted coconspirator, both the historical presentment power of the
grand jury and the public's interest in the faithful execution of the laws by the Execu-
tive combine to mitigate the due process considerations."). For a discussion of the issues
raised by a grand jury naming a person as an unindicted coconspirator, see generally
Golladay, supra note 77.
The courts in Briggs and Jordan distinguished the grand jury's authority to issue
reports accusing a public official of noncriminal misconduct from its action of accusing
a person of criminal misconduct by naming the person as an unindicted coconspirator.
See Briggs, 514 F.2d at 801, 805-06; Jordan, 439 F. Supp. at 204-05. Neither court
challenged the constitutionality of the grand jury's authority to report on noncriminal
misconduct by public officials. See supra note 73.
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prosecutor may recommend against indictment1 25 The prosecutor could
not, however, advise the grand jury to issue a report that reveals the
results of its investigation since the evidence before the grand jury is
indictable. The grand jury would instead be required to choose between
returning a no-true bill or an indictment, the same choices it faces in
any criminal investigation.
If a no-true bill is returned, the public may never learn of the
official's violation of the public trust that occurred when discretionary
action was taken to benefit the contributor. On the other hand, if a
prosecution is initiated, the central issue at trial will be whether the
official's action was a quid pro quo for the contribution, not whether
the official disregarded the public interest. An acquittal may create the
public perception that the official has been exonerated of all wrongdo-
ing, even though the only issue decided was whether the elements of the
crime of receiving a bribe were established beyond a reasonable
doubt. 26 Therefore, the New Jersey rule is not always in the public's
best interest.
Similarly, a prosecution, compared to a report, may not always
benefit the official. Although it provides a forum for response, a prose-
"' In his article discussing the multitude of factors influencing prosecutorial dis-
cretion, Professor Kaplan noted how the fear of losing highly publicized prosecutions
affected charging decisions when he was an Assistant United States Attorney:
There were also some very personal reasons for the assistant to exer-
cise caution in authorizing prosecution. Although he was under relatively
little supervision in his daily activities, he had to be careful to stay in the
good graces of the United States Attorney, who, holding an essentially po-
litical position, was very sensitive to the criticism of the press, the judges,
and the defense bar, all of whom were quick to note a rising number of
acquittals and ascribe this to either incompetence in the staff or to
overzealousness in the choice of targets for prosecution. The feeling that it
was important to make certain that the office came under no undue criti-
cism applied with additional force where the defendant was prominent in
the community. Though such prosecutions, of course, were not always
successful, it was generally felt that where the public eye would be on the
prosecution, the criticism would be all the more severe if the case were
lost. As a result, it was often stated that "if you go after a big one, you
must be pretty sure you can get him."
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174, 181
(1965); see also Frampton, Some Practical and Ethical Problems of Prosecuting Pub-
lic Officials, 36 MD. L. REV. 5, 18 (1976) (noting that prosecutors in the Watergate
investigation employed a higher standard of proof for recommending indictment than
probable cause). But see Baron, A Response: Watergate Procedures for All?, 36 MD.
L. REV. 35, 37-38 (1976) (a criticism of Frampton's view that a higher standard for
indictability should be applied in public corruption cases because it creates "a double or
even triple standard in the administration of justice. . . . By formulating variable
norms in order to do justice in different types of cases. . . we are evading our commit-
ment to equality and neutral principles in the administration of justice.").
126 See infra text accompanying notes 193-94.
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cution also creates the risk of a criminal conviction and sanction. If
given a chance, many officials would no doubt prefer that the grand
jury issue a report rather than an indictment.
12 7
Although New Jersey's rule forces the grand jury to initiate a
prosecution to reveal noncriminal misconduct, it also partially responds
to Judge Fuld's criticism of the reporting function as premised on the
application of a vague concept of misconduct. By adopting a "bright
line" nonindictability standard for the exercise of the reporting author-
ity, New Jersey's approach specifies the type of misconduct that may be
revealed by a report: noncriminal official misconduct.
Judge Fuld would no doubt respond that any standard of miscon-
duct used to define the scope of the reporting authority is fatally vague,
as it is ultimately based upon "the grand jury's own criteria of public
or private morals, [that charge] the violation of subjective and unex-
pressed standards of morality."12 That criticism of the reporting func-
tion, however, is not particularly troubling.
Rather than being based on "subjective and unexpressed standards
of morality," the circumstances that constitute official misconduct are
described by the common law and statutory fiduciary standards im-
posed on public officials.129 Those standards are frequently applied in
two situations: noncriminal proceedings where public officials are held
accountable for violating the public trust through discipline and re-
moval and criminal prosecutions where accountability is imposed
through a criminal sanction.
As judicially interpreted and applied, the fiduciary standards im-
1'27 One option for allowing the grand jury to issue a report when it uncovers
indictable misconduct is to authorize a limited report that excludes the incriminating
evidence. In the bribe receiving hypothetical, under this approach, the grand jury could
reveal that the official took a discretionary action at the request of the contributor but
not that a contribution was received the day before the action. This approach publicizes
the violation of the public trust, yet removes the inference of criminality raised by the
recent contribution.
A "sanitized" report, however, is unlikely to satisfy either the official or the sup-
porters of the reporting authority. The official may object that the grand jury has im-
plicitly suggested that she committed a crime by her actions because of the contributor's
past support and that the release of the report will inevitably lead to discovery of the
recent contribution. For example, the report's release may initiate a review of campaign
contributions on file with the State Election Commission. Supporters of the reporting
function will assert the public's right to know all the grand jury's evidence relevant to
the violation of the public trust.
12 Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d at 154, 173 N.E.2d at 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 40; see also Ex
parte Burns, 261 Ala. 217, 221, 73 So. 2d 912, 915 (1954) (report allows grand jury
"to set up its own standards of public or private morals"); Comment, supra note 6, at
719 (stating that a mixture of law, ethics, and individual notions of morality guide the
grand jury in censuring persons for noncriminal conduct).
121 See supra notes 1, 4.
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posed on public officials in noncriminal cases appear no less precise nor
any more subjectively moral than some of the standards the grand jury
uses to initiate criminal prosecutions."' If the lack of a precise stan-
dard of prohibited behavior is sometimes unavoidable in the grand
jury's criminal accusatory role, general standards that define improper
conduct by public officials should likewise not prevent the grand jury
from exercising its reporting function. Moreover, recent statutory ef-
forts to comprehensively regulate the conduct of public officials have
clarified the extent of the official's common law fiduciary duties by pre-
cisely describing prohibited behavior, 1' and those specific standards
can be used by the grand jury in its reporting function.
The standards under which the grand jury should exercise the re-
130 For example, a finding that a public official knowingly failed to perform a
duty "clearly inherent in the nature of his office" establishes the crime of official mis-
conduct under New York's penal code. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00(2) (McKinney
1975).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) defines the cul-
pable mental state of "recklessly" as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and pur-
pose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disre-
gard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
This definition has been substantially adopted by most recent state criminal code
revisions. See I MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 commentary (Offi-
cial Draft and Revised Comments 1985). In discussing the definition, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code acknowledged the value judgment that it required of the jury:
Some principle must be articulated, however, to indicate what final
judgment is demanded after everything is weighed. There is no way to
state this value-judgment that does not beg the question in the last analy-
sis; the point is that the jury must evaluate the conduct and determine
whether it should be condemned.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
In addition, prior to McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), public
officials had been prosecuted under the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982), for depriving the public of its right to "honest and faithful services." United
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). In
McNally, however, the Court examined the legislative history of the mail fraud statute
and concluded that the statute only applied to fraudulent schemes for obtaining prop-
erty and did not protect the public's intangible right to good government. McNally, 107
S. Ct. at 2879. The Court, however, did not hold that the Congress lacked authority to
protect intangible rights under the mail fraud statute, but rather, that if it intends to
protect such rights, "it must speak more clearly than it has." Id. at 2881.
131 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-84(g) (West Supp. 1987) (prohibiting
public official from soliciting or accepting anything of value, based on understanding
that favorable official action would be forthcoming); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(3)
(West 1982) (prohibiting public official from doing business with a company in which
she or her family has a material interest).
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porting function when a violation of the public trust may also be crimi-
nal are, however, difficult to define. As the coverage of the criminal law
continues to expand in regulating the conduct of public officials, many
violations of the public trust will also implicate criminal offenses. 32
Limiting the reporting function to the ability to reveal noncriminal mis-
conduct does little to define the scope of the grand jury's authority,
except when a violation of the public trust is not regulated by the crim-
inal law.133
Defining the reporting authority by reference to the indictability of
the official's misconduct admittedly guides the grand jury, the prosecu-
tor, and the court in determining when a report may be prepared and
published. At the same time, it forces the grand jury to initiate a prose-
cution to reveal indictable misconduct even though there may be a sub-
stantial chance that a conviction cannot be obtained. In some instances,
however, the grand jury and prosecutor may conclude that the public
interest can be more effectively served by revealing official misconduct
in a report rather than by initiating a prosecution. Can the public in-
terest furthered by the reporting function ever outweigh the interests of
a public official when a report reveals an indictable violation of the
public trust? This issue is raised by the Watergate and Alaska Im-
peachment Reports.
C. The Watergate Report: Balancing the Competing Interests
As the grand jury investigation into the Watergate burglary and
cover-up drew to a close, members of the Watergate Special Prosecu-
tion Force considered how to proceed against President Nixon. 13  Al-
132 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00(2) (McKinney 1975) (misdemeanor crime of
official misconduct for a public servant, acting with "intent to obtain a benefit or to
injure or deprive another person of a benefit," to knowingly fail to perform a duty
"clearly inherent in the nature of his office."). Many of the conflict of interest statutes
contain criminal as well as civil penalties. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A, § 7-
8 (Law Co-op. 1980).
"' Most grand jury criminal investigations, however, will raise quantitative evi-
dentiary problems, and if the official's misconduct is indictable, the criminality or non-
criminality of that misconduct can only be determined at trial. Qualitative evidentiary
problems are likely to occur less frequently, but when they do arise, the criminality of
the official's misconduct depends on unsettled questions of law.
"' For a brief history of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, created in the
Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute crimes arising from the June, 1972
burglary of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel,
see WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT 4-20 (U.S. Government
Printing Office pub., 1975) [hereinafter WATERGATE REPORT]. For an enlightening
account of the conflicts among the prosecuting team regarding how to proceed against
the President, see R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, STONEWALL: THE REAL STORY
OF THE WATERGATE PROSECUTION 211-46 (1977).
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though all agreed that the evidence was quantitatively sufficient to in-
dict the President for obstruction of justice and related crimes,135
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski doubted that a sitting president
could constitutionally be charged with obstruction of justice, particu-
larly when that conduct was the basis of an impeachment inquiry al-
ready initiated by the House Judiciary Committee." 6 Applying the
suggested distinction between the quantitative and qualitative eviden-
tiary problems,""7 the difficulty Jaworski saw in indicting the President
can best be characterized as a qualitative evidentiary problem. Regard-
less of the strength of evidence that the President committed criminal
misconduct, that misconduct might not have been indictable while he
remained in office.1 a8
In his concluding remarks to the grand jury, Jaworski advised
against indicting the President because of the uncertainty on the immu-
nity issue and the availability of the impeachment inquiry to determine
if the President's misconduct justified removal from the office. 39
1"5 See R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 226-27; L. JA-
WORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE 99
(1976).
16 See L. JAWORSII, supra note 135, at 100. See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 756-58 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (McKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (positing that the proposition that a President may only be subject to the criminal
law after impeachment essentially derives from implications inherent in the impeach-
ment clause, contemporaneous views of the Framers, and the need for a President to
remain free to fulfill constitutional duties); UNITED STATES V. NIXON, THE PRESI-
DENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 319, 379-87 (L. Friedman ed. 1974) (quoting
Brief for Richard M. Nixon, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (No. 73-
1766)) (arguing that impeachment is the exclusive remedy for presidential criminal
misconduct). But see id. at 209, 271 n.77 (quoting Brief for the United States, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (No. 73-1834)) (arguing that the Constitution
does not warrant presidential immunity from the ordinary process of criminal law prior
to impeachment and removal); Danielson, Presidential Immunity From Criminal Pros-
ecution, 63 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1066-69 (1975) (questioning both the argument that the
sequence of events in article I-impeachment, then criminal prosecution-indicates the
Framers' intent that Presidents be immune from criminal prosecution while in office
and the argument that since article II vests the entire executive power in one person, an
incumbent President must be immune from criminal prosecution to ensure the proper
functioning of the executive branch).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
13. This qualitative evidentiary problem, however, differs from the one previously
discussed of whether a campaign contribution is a benefit under the bribe receiving
statute. See id. If the contribution was not a benefit, the public official could never be
prosecuted for receiving the contribution. On the other hand, if the President was con-
stitutionally immune from prosecution, his immunity presented a bar to prosecution
only while he remained in office. See L. JAWORSKI, supra note 135, at 100 (Special
Prosecutor Leon Jaworski discussing his doubts concerning the indictability of a sitting
president for the offense of obstruction of justice).
"s9 Jaworski's recommendation came after exhaustive legal research and consider-
ation of the grave Constitutional issues involved:
It will not be necessary to weigh the evidence to determine whether there
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Jaworski recommended instead that the grand jury transmit evidence of
the President's involvement in the cover-up in a report to the House
Judiciary Committee."" Jaworski further requested that the grand jury
authorize the naming of the President as an unindicted coconspirator in
connection with the trial of seven former members of his staff and elec-
tion campaign indicted by the grand jury.141 The grand jury agreed
with both recommendations. 42
Determining the contents of the Watergate report was one of the
most divisive issues faced by the prosecution team. Jaworski concluded
that the best way to ensure transmittal of the grand jury's evidence to
Congress was to prepare a report that could not be interpreted as ac-
cusing the President of misconduct and proposed that the report trans-
mit evidence without summary or analysis.1" It is understandable why
Jaworski favored this approach. If a report reveals only evidence, no
explicit grand jury accusation of misconduct is made and the report is
is probable cause to indict. The legal doubt that a sitting President is in-
dictable for offenses of the type considered by you is so substantial that
indictment of the President should be ruled out. It would not be responsi-
ble conduct in my opinion to return an indictment against the President in
the present uncertain state of the law, only to learn in the end that the
United States Supreme Court holds such action to be unconstitutional.
The trauma the nation would suffer in the interim, let alone the scars
such actions would leave on the institution of the Presidency, renders such
action inadvisable, regardless of whether the evidence otherwise would
warrant it.
J. DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE BATTLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS
Cox AND JAWORSET 307-08 (1977). Jaworski added that there was another sound
reason for not proceeding against the President. The House impeachment inquiry was
well under way, he said, and "[The House] is the appropriate body under the Consti-
tution, in my view, for examining in the first instance evidence relating to the President
to determine whether he should be charged with conduct justifying impeachment and
removal from office." Id. at 308; see also R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra
note 134, at 244, 253 (discussing Jaworski's belief that it "would not be responsible
conduct" to indict the President); L. JAWORSKI, supra note 135, at 100 (concluding
that to indict an incumbent president would result in delay in determining culpability
and would result in a denial of the president's right to a fair trial).
140 R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 246-47; J. DOYLE,
supra note 139, at 308.
141 R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 246-47. The constitu-
tionality of that action was challenged by the President in his brief appealing the dis-
trict court order that required him to provide subpoenaed evidence, including tapes of
oval office conversations, to the Special Prosecutor. See UNITED STATES V. NIXON,
THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 319, 387-95 (L. Friedman ed. 1974)
(quoting Brief for Richard M. Nixon, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(No. 73-1766)). In affirming the district court's order, the Supreme Court did not de-
cide the coconspirator issue. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687 n.2.
142 R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 246-47.
143 Id. at 241-42; L. JAWORSKI, supra note 135, at 101. It has been tantalizingly
suggested that Jaworski's insistence on this form of report was based on ex parte con-
tacts with Judge Sirica. See J. DOYLE, supra note 139, at 285.
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less susceptible to the objection that it is indistinguishable from an in-
dictment. Furthermore, since the grand jury was not seeking the re-
port's public distribution, but merely the report's transmittal to Con-
gress, the public could never mistake the report for the equivalent of a
criminal accusation.
Other members of the prosecution team, however, favored a more
comprehensive report than Jaworski had suggested. The report they
envisioned would not only transmit evidence, but would summarize and
comment on the evidence and state the "theory of the case" against the
President.'" The report would
show how the tapes and other evidence fit together and
demonstrate that the President had been trying to hold the
cover-up together in March and April of 1973. The report
could also juxtapose the President's public statements deny-
ing knowledge of the cover-up with evidence from the tapes
showing he really knew far more.145
The report ultimately prepared by the Watergate grand jury rep-
resented a compromise between Jaworski and his staff that the prosecu-
tors referred to as the "road map."146 The road map did not comment
on the evidence against the President or offer conclusions. Instead, it
was a list of short statements that detailed the President's involvement
in the cover-up, followed by references to supporting evidence transmit-
ted to the Committee.1 47 Its drafters intended the road map to "serve as
144 R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 241-42.
145 Id. at 242.
146 Id. at 242-43.
147 Id. at 247. The report has never been made public, but in his book reviewing
the Watergate criminal investigation, the press spokesperson for the Special Prosecu-
tor's Office provides the most detailed published account of how it was organized:
It was a simple document, fifty-five pages long, with only a sentence
or two on each of the pages. Each page was a reference to a piece of
evidence-sentences from one of the tape recordings, quotations from
grand jury testimony.
This is how the road map worked: One page might say, "On March
16, 1973, E. Howard Hunt demanded $120,000." Then it would list page
references to grand jury testimony from witnesses who saw Hunt's black-
mail note and references to the tapes where Hunt's demand was discussed.
The grand jury transcripts and the tape transcripts would be included.
The next page might say, "On March 21, 1973, John Dean told President
Nixon that Hunt had demanded $120,000 and that he estimated Hunt
and the other Watergate defendants would 'cost' a million dollars in the
next two years." More grand jury and tape transcript page references.
The next page might say, "President Nixon responded, 'For Christ's sake,
get it' "; and there would be further references to the tapes.
J. DOYLE, supra note 139, at 290-91 (footnote omitted).
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a do-it-yourself kit for the Judiciary Committee, helping it to reassem-
ble the individual pieces of grand-jury testimony and other evidence
into a coherent theory of a criminal case . . ,,114 Thus, while the
Watergate report stopped short of directly accusing the President of
misconduct, "[aln inexorable logic marched through its pages. The con-
clusion that the President of the United States took part in a criminal
conspiracy became inescapable." '1 49
In June, 1972 Report, District Judge Sirica considered whether
to transmit the Watergate report to the House Judiciary Committee
and concluded that it was necessary to decide two issues to answer that
question.15 First, Judge Sirica considered whether the grand jury has
the "power to make reports and recommendations." 51 Judge Sirica an-
swered that question in the affirmative 52 and supported his conclusion
with federal case law acknowledging the grand jury's reporting author-
ity. 53 He then distinguished the Watergate report from the objection-
able features of reports disapproved in two other federal cases: 5"
The Report ...draws no accusatory conclusions. It
deprives no one of an official forum in which to respond. It
is not a substitute for indictments where indictments might
properly issue. It contains no recommendations, advice or
statements that infringe on the prerogatives of other branches
of government. Indeed, its only recommendation is to the
Court, and rather than injuring separation of powers princi-
ples, the Jury sustains them by lending its aid to the House
in the exercise of that body's constitutional jurisdiction. It
14s R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 242-43.
141 J. DOYLE, supra note 139, at 291.
150 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1221-22.
151 Id. at 1221.
152 Id. at 1226.
153 Id. at 1223-24 (citing In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled
January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d
458 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Johnson, 484 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1973)).
14 The first case, In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), involved a report critical of private persons and is discussed supra at
note 10. The second case, Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio), afl'd,
450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971), concerned a report that rendered moral and social judg-
ments on the policies, attitudes, and conduct of those connected with the shootings at
Kent State University in 1970. The report contained derogatory accusations directed
towards the university administration, faculty, and students. The Hammond court was
concerned that such a report presented separation of powers problems. As Judge Sirica
stated, "Hammond relied upon Ohio law for the proposition that the grand jury lacked
statutory authority to return a report of that kind in that case, noting further that
common-law crimes and common-law criminal procedures were nonexistent in Ohio."
June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1225 (citation omitted).
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renders no moral or social judgments. The Report is a sim-
ple and straightforward compilation of information gathered
by the Grand Jury, and no more.155
Satisfied that the grand jury acted properly in preparing its report,
Judge Sirica turned to the second threshold issue raised by the report:
"whether the Court has power to disclose [a grand jury report] and, if
so, to what extent. ' 156 Having rejected the argument that traditional
justifications for grand jury secrecy prevented release of the report,
1 57
Judge Sirica determined that since the report was a proper exercise of
the reporting function, public release appeared to be appropriate. The
grand jury's request seemed even more reasonable as it requested trans-
mittal of its report only to the House Judiciary Committee "for a deci-
sion on what action, if any, might be warranted in the
circumstances."15 8
Judge Sirica balanced a variety of competing interests in deciding
whether to transmit the Watergate report to Congress1 59 and concluded
151 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1226.
156 Id. at 1221-22.
157 Id. at 1227-30.
151 Id. at 1221. The language quoted in the text is Judge Sirica's characterization
of the grand jury's request. Two former members of the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force noted that the request was phrased slightly differently and argued that the actual
request reflected an important clue as to the grand jury's intention if the President was
not impeached. They noted that when a draft of the report was submitted to the grand
jury, the jurors insisted on only one change:
The preamble, as approved by the jurors, was changed to say that they
would "presently" defer to the Judiciary Committee and allow the com-
mittee to decide what should be done "at this time." This language was a
none-too-subtle hint to the Congress that the jury would still be around to
move against the president if the politicians faltered. Strangely, when the
preamble was eventually made public, none of the media commentators
remarked on these highly pregnant phrases.
R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 247.
159 See June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1226-30. A balancing test for decid-
ing whether to release grand jury reports had been suggested in a Fifth Circuit case,
cited by Judge Sirica. There, the court summarized several factors to be considered in
making release decisions:
[W]hether the report describes general community conditions or whether it
refers to identifiable individuals; whether the individuals are mentioned in
public or private capacities; the public interest in the contents of the report
balanced against the harm to the individuals named; the availability and
efficacy of remedies; whether the conduct described is indictable.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Com-
ment, supra note 6, at 725 (arguing that a distinction should be made between reports
in which individuals are named and reports that relate to general conditions in public
institutions); Comment, supra note 5, at 353 (proposing a "reputation" distinction that
differentiates between reports that censure institutions that depend on their reputations,
such as universities, and those that do not, such as municipal water departments).
[Vol. 136:73
GRAND JURY REPORTS
that its transmittal to the House Judiciary Committee was "eminently
proper, and indeed, obligatory."' 0 He emphasized that the report con-
cerned the conduct of a public official'' and that the public interest in
transmittal was substantial since "[ilt would be difficult to conceive of a
more compelling need than that of this country for an unswervingly
fair [impeachment] inquiry based on all the pertinent information."'6 2
Indeed, the public interest in the report was so significant that Judge
Sirica suggested that the grand jury might even have been justified in
seeking its public release.'
The potential harm of the report to the President seemed minimal
when balanced against the public interest in disclosure. Judge Sirica,
who had noted earlier in the opinion that the report was not a "substi-
tute for indictments where indictments might properly issue,"' 64 now
emphasized that the President did not object to release and was free to
challenge any material in the report that might be used against him in
the impeachment inquiry.' 65 The President, therefore, was not "left
without a forum in which to adjudicate any charges against him that
might employ Report materials."' 66
D. The Alaska Impeachment Report
1. The Grand Jury Investigation and Report
The report that recommended the initiation of impeachment pro-
ceedings against the Governor of Alaska arose from a grand jury inves-
tigation into the award of a state lease for office space.' 67 The investi-
gation centered on allegations that the Governor's office had
manipulated the state's competitive bidding process to ensure that the
lease was awarded to a partnership including a major gubernatorial
campaign fundraiser."'
':0 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1227.
1 1 Id.
162 Id. at 1230.
183 Id. The grand jury, of course, had requested transmittal only to the House
Judiciary Committee, which would use the evidence in the report in deciding whether
there were sufficient grounds for impeachment and a trial in the Senate. Since public
disclosure of the report may have been justified, Judge Sirica reasoned that there was
''certainly ample basis for disclosure to a body that in this setting acts simply as another
grand jury." Id.
164 Id. at 1226; see also supra text accompanying note 123 (grand jury's reporting
function distinguished from indicting function and praised for its ability to hold public
officials accountable for actions that do not rise to the level of indictable offenses).
"65 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1227.
166 Id.
1617 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
168 Id.
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The Governor's Chief of Staff and the fundraiser were two grand
jury witnesses. Primarily as a result of their testimony, the grand jury
learned the following about the lease award: in late September of 1984,
the Governor sent the draft bidding documents for the lease to the
fundraiser at the fundraiser's request; 69 when the documents were
sent, the specifications for the lease award had been approved by the
Governor's office but the documents had not been released to other pro-
spective bidders; 170 in early October of 1984, the Governor attended a
meeting with his Chief of Staff during which the fundraiser requested
changes to the draft bidding documents to ensure that his partnership
would be the only eligible bidder for the lease 17 and that the effect of
the requested changes was discussed during that meeting;" 2 the Chief
of Staff left the meeting with the understanding that he was to bring
about the requested changes and that he did so with the encouragement
and support of the Governor;' the changes were made, the fun-
draiser's partnership was the only eligible bidder, and the lease was
awarded to the partnership.
7 4
This evidence raised the possibility that the Governor had commit-
ted two crimes in connection with the lease award and his grand jury
testimony. The first was official misconduct by encouraging his Chief
of Staff to bring about the changes requested by the fundraiser.' The
second was perjury by testifying before the grand jury that he had no
recollection of the early October meeting and other key events sur-
rounding the lease award. 76
169 ALASKA IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 14-15, 38-39.
170 Id. at 14-15, 36-37.
171 Id. at 39-42. The changes narrowed the geographical area in which the state
was seeking office space and required the state to assume occupancy earlier than origi-
nally specified in the draft documents. These changes precluded new construction to
meet the state's request for office space and ensured that the fundraiser's partnership
would be the only eligible bidder. See id.
171 Id. at 41, 64. The Chief of Staff testified that the only reason given by the
contributor in support of the requested changes was that it would eliminate other po-
tential bidders for the lease. Id. at 41.
173 Id. at 3-4, 7, 62-63.
174 Id. at 42-50.
17' The crime of official misconduct is committed under Alaska law if a public
servant, with intent to obtain a benefit, knowingly performs an unauthorized act relat-
ing to her office or fails to perform a duty imposed by law or inherent in the nature of
her office. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.850 (1983). The definition of benefit is broad
enough to include any advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire of the public
servant. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(2) (1983) ("[Blenefit means a present or
future gain or advantage to the beneficiary or to a third person pursuant to the desire
or consent of the beneficiary.").
171 Perjury is committed under Alaska law if a person "makes a false sworn state-
ment which the person does not believe to be true." ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.200 (1983).
The definition of statement includes representations of a person's state of mind.
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At the conclusion of the investigation, the two lead prosecutors,
Special Counsel George Frampton, Jr.17 and the state's Chief Prosecu-
tor, Daniel W. Hickey, addressed the grand jurors and offered them
two options for resolving their case against the Governor: indict the
Governor, or issue a public report on their investigation."' 8 To assist
the grand jury in considering the first option, the prosecutors circulated
a draft indictment that charged the Governor with one count of official
misconduct and six counts of perjury.179 The prosecutors also provided
the grand jury with the first sections of a draft report.1 80
ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.240(1) (1983).
177 Frampton's appointment as Special Counsel occurred thirteen years after he
argued unsuccessfully with Jaworski for a report spelling out the "theory of the case"
against President Nixon. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44. In the Alaska
investigation, Frampton had the authority to participate with the state's Chief Prosecu-
tor in all decisions that concerned the investigation and to present the grand jury with
independent advice and recommendations at the conclusion of the evidence. See Letter
from Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General, to George Frampton (May 23, 1985) [on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
The appointment of a Special Counsel in the case was no doubt influenced by the
fact that in Alaska the Attorney General is appointed by the Governor and serves at his
pleasure. See ALASKA CONsT. art. III, § 25. The state's Chief Prosecutor, in turn, is
appointed by the Attorney General. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.25.020, 44.23.010
(1986). The involvement of an outside Special Counsel in the case minimized the con-
cern that the Chief Prosecutor's handling of the investigation might have been influ-
enced by his position being ultimately dependent on the continued support of the Gov-
ernor. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings for the Grand Jury Convened in Juneau,
.Alaska, Commencing April 24, 1985, Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings, June 19-
21, 1985, at 2075-76 (Alaska Super. Ct.) [hereinafter Grand Jury Transcript]
(Frampton describes himself as an outsider unfamiliar with the facts or politics sur-
rounding the investigation.)
This Article can quote directly from the grand jury proceedings because virtually
the entire grand jury transcript was made public by the superior court several days
after the report was released. Only the names of the jurors, confidential exibits, and
items such as business notebooks were kept from the public. See In re the Grand Jury
for the First Judicial District at Juneau for the Term of Proceedings Commencing in
April, 1985, No. 1JU-85-1600 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 1985) (mem.).
178 Grand Jury Transcript, supra note 177, at 2522-23. Chief Prosecutor Hickey
also briefly discussed a third option: an indictment followed by an abbreviated report.
Id.
179 Id. at 2538-39, 2547-64. The draft indictment alleged that the Governor com-
mitted official misconduct by knowingly failing to perform
a duty clearly inherent to the nature of his office, that duty being to serve
the public loyally, honestly, and faithfully ahead of any and all private
interests and that he breached this duty by encouraging that action be
taken by [his Chief of Staff] to eliminate competition for [the state lease]
with the intent to obtain a benefit for other persons, knowing when he did
so that he was placing the private interests of these persons above the
interests of the public.
Id. at 2562. The six draft perjury counts alleged that the Governor testified falsely
when he told the grand jury he had no recollection of the early October meeting with
the contributor and other key events concerning the lease award. Id. at 2547-62.
180 Id. at 2531-38. The contents of the draft report had been suggested by the
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In addition to distributing the draft indictment and report, the
prosecutors presented their separate views on the two alternatives.'
Neither prosecutor instructed the grand jury to consider issuing a re-
port only if it determined the Governor's conduct was not indictable.
Instead, Frampton told the grand jury that the Governor could be in-
dicted on five of the proposed counts" 2 but nevertheless recommended
that a report be issued.' 8 He drew a parallel to the Watergate investi-
gation 8 4 and told the grand jury it faced the same decision as the
Watergate grand jury: "to indict a chief executive or take some other
course of action instead that would attempt to hold him accountable for
serious criminal conduct."' 1 5 Essentially, Frampton asked the grand
jury to make a public policy decision: when there is sufficient evidence
to indict a sitting governor for criminal misconduct, is the public inter-
est better served by a comprehensive report that publicizes the miscon-
duct than by a prosecution?
Frampton characterized a report as "an option which accomplishes
more of the goals . . .we would all like to see accomplished in this
case, principally to hold the person who did wrong accountable for that
and, secondarily, to make sure that the facts are eventually made avail-
able to the public in an authoritative fashion."' 6 The report, he ar-
gued, placed "the ultimate issue of accountability in the place where it
ultimately belongs in the case of the chief executive of the state, which
is with the public . . ,11 A report "had the advantage[] of getting
all of the facts out in a fairly organized manner and getting them out
grand jury little more than a week earlier when it decided to grant immunity to the
Governor's Chief of Staff to compel his testimony and, following that testimony, to
issue a public report of its investigation. Id. at 2161, 2162-70, 2175. When the grand
jury decided to compel the testimony of the Chief of Staff, it also recognized that his
testimony might lead to the initiation of criminal charges against other persons. Id. at
2175-78.
181 Id. at 2566-89 (Frampton's views), 2589-96 (Hickey's views).
182 Frampton stated that it was "absolutely clear from the evidence" that the Gov-
ernor had committed crimes. Id. at 2567. He concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to support an indictment on two of the perjury counts, but he told the grand
jury that the remaining four perjury counts and the count of official misconduct were
indictable. Id. at 2572, 2576-78.
The state's Chief Prosecutor never specifically stated whether he believed the evi-
dence supported an indictment on any of the draft counts. However, in a subsequent
characterization of his grand jury remarks, the Chief Prosecutor concluded that he had
"generally stressed that the evidence supported the return of an indictment . .. .
Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 17.
181 Grand Jury Transcript, supra note 177, at 2571.
184 Id. at 2566-68.
185 Id. at 2567.
186 Id. at 2586.
187 Id. at 2587.
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quickly." '188 An indictment, on the other hand, would "basically bring
the state government to a halt for the next year-to paralyze it
"1189
Although Frampton concluded that five of the seven proposed
criminal counts were indictable, 9 he worried that evidentiary consid-
erations made the case not very "attractive" from the standpoint of ob-
taining a conviction. 9 ' He told the grand jury that an acquittal after a
trial "would be the most disastrous result of all" and that "this is not
the kind of case that anybody can afford have go to trial and not result
in a conviction.' 1 92 In response to a juror's question about the effect of
an acquittal on a politician's reputation, 93 Frampton replied that "[a]s
a practical matter, acquittal would represent that [the politician] was
vindicated and that it was prosecutorial over-reaching to charge
him.""' Relying upon this fear of acquittal and the public interest in
accountability, Frampton strongly advocated issuing a report despite
the existence of sufficient evidence for indictment.
After deliberation, the grand jury followed Frampton's recommen-
dation and decided to issue a report that "ha[d] some very specific and
strong language in it.' 95 The grand jury requested that its report in-
clude a finding that the Governor and some members of his administra-
tion were unfit for public office and a recommendation that the legisla-
ture initiate impeachment proceedings against the Governor.'96 The
grand jury foreperson added that if a report that contained "very spe-
cific and strong language" was not within its powers, the grand jurors
wanted to "reserve the right to change [their] minds.' 97 Prosecutors
subsequently contended that this statement reflected the grand jury's
readiness to indict the Governor if the court blocked publication of the
report.' 98 Interviews with the grand jurors also supported this
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2587-88.
180 Frampton told the grand jury that there was "certainly sufficient evidence...
for someone to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt" that the Governor had committed
perjury. Id. at 2584.
191 Id. at 2578-83. Frampton's main concern involved the admissibility of evidence
that the Governor's Chief of Staff lied to the investigators in an attempt to protect the
Governor. He feared that since the Chief of Staff faced no charges of obstruction of
justice or conspiracy, the most damaging evidence of the Governor's perjury would not
reach the trial jurors. Id. at 2579-83.
192 Id. at 2620.
1,3 Id. at 2622.
194 Id. at 2623.
195 Id. at 2629.
196 Id. at 2630.
197 Id. at 2629-30.
18 Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 20.
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interpretation."9 9
The Alaska Impeachment Report never states that the Governor's
misconduct was noncriminal. Instead, it suggests that the misconduct
was criminal and implies that the grand jury decided to forego prosecu-
tion to more effectively promote the seven goals cited in the report's
introduction."0 The report contains a finding that the Governor is unfit
for public office 20 ' and provides a detailed summary of the evidence
heard by the grand jury.202 The summary includes seven excerpts from
the Governor's testimony in which he failed to recall key events per-
taining to the lease, including the October meeting.2 3 A summary of
key evidence calling into question the veracity of the Governor's claims
of lack of recollection accompanies each excerpt. 204 The text of the re-
port, as a whole, communicates the strong implication that the Gover-
nor committed perjury.2 5 The report can also be read to accuse the
Governor of the crime of official misconduct, but, in this instance, the
inference of criminality is not as strong as the suggestion of perjury.20 6
199 See Inside Look at the Grand Jury, Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Aug. 8,
1985, at 1, col. 1, 15, cols. 2, 4 (remarks of Al Baffone, Sr., business manager and
secretary treasurer of Public Employees Local 71 in Anchorage) ("[Fourteen jurors]
voted to issue their scathing report. The 15th juror wanted to indict the governor.
There was, as the jurors put it, 'no one for innocent.' . . . Because the jurors didn't
believe [the Governor's] testimony, they were prepared to indict him for perjury if their
report had been suppressed.").
200 -To be positive, constructive and impartial in our outlook and
actions;
-To best serve the publicinterest, as viewed in the widest sense;
-To hold elected and appointed public officials accountable for their
actions;
-To encourage changes in public policy, regulations and laws so as
to better protect the public interest in the future;
-To enhance public awareness of the facts of wrongdoing or abuse
of office by public officials, to the greatest extent possible;
-To make sure insofar as possible that justice is served; and
-To provide a deterrent against wrongdoing and abuse of office by
public officials in the future.
ALASKA IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 5-6.
201 Id. at 1-6.
202 Id. at 21-67.
203 Id. at 59-67. At least one court has addressed the question whether a grand
jury report can contain transcripts of grand jury testimony. See McClatchy Newspapers
v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Cal. App. 1985) (holding that a court could
not refuse to file a grand jury's report that included transcripts of testimony of wit-
nesses who appeared before it during the investigation).
204 ALASKA IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 59-67.
205 The grand jury expressed "grave concerns" about the Governor's inability to
recall key events about the lease award and characterized his testimony as reflecting "a
lack of candor and a disrespect for the laws of this state." Id. at 14.
206 The grand jury observed that the conduct undertaken to favor the campaign
fundraiser might constitute the crime of official misconduct under Alaska law but con-
cluded that the statute was "potentially inadequate to deter" the conduct investigated
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By publicly accusing the Governor of misconduct and by implying
that his misconduct may have been criminal, the Alaska Impeachment
Report exemplifies Judge Fuld's concern that accusation by indictment
and report are indistinguishable. On the other hand, Judge Sirica's
characterization of the Watergate report makes it the paradigm of a
report that withstands Judge Fuld's concern. However, some aspects of
the reports are not as dissimilar as they initially appear.
2. The Watergate and Alaska Impeachment Reports Compared
Despite superficial dissimilarities, the Watergate and Alaska Im-
peachment Reports are substantively similar in that both reveal sus-
pected criminal misconduct by a chief executive. On the other hand, the
reports were released to different audiences and, most importantly, dif-
fer in the reasons each prosecutor advanced for issuing a report as an
alternative to prosecution. Whereas Jaworski's preference for a report
was driven by the concern that a sitting president was immune from
prosecution, Frampton's preference was based on his belief that a pub-
lic report was the faster and more effective route to holding the Gover-
nor accountable for violating the public trust.2 '7
The Alaska Impeachment Report accuses the Governor of miscon-
duct in unmistakable terms by criticizing the Governor for his lack of
candor and disrespect for state law.208 Similarly, although Judge Sirica
emphasized that the Watergate Report was a "simple and straightfor-
ward compilation of information" that drew "no accusatory conclu-
sions,"209 the compilation of evidence in the Watergate road map stated
"a coherent theory of a criminal case"21 against the President that the
by the grand jury for two reasons. Id. at 9. First, the grand jury noted that the statute
might require a showing that a defendant undertook an action to benefit a private
person knowing that the action was inconsistent with the state's best interest. The
grand jury concluded that such a "showing may be difficult or impossible to make even
when it is clear that a public official has acted with primary intent to benefit a private
person, if that action could later, in hindsight, be rationalized as consistent with some
governmental policy." Id. Second, the grand jury concluded that "the criminal process
inevitably tends to single out for responsibility those who take the most visible ac-
tions-in this case, [the Governor's Chief of Staff]." Id. The grand jury noted that
responsibility for that action "must rightfully be shared, as here, by others who ap-
proved the action and on whose behalf the action was taken." Id. Thus, while the
grand jury acknowledged that the Governor's conduct potentially did not come within
the coverage of the crime of official misconduct, it never concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to warrant indictment.
207 It is doubtful whether the goals Frampton advanced are served best by the
issuance of a public report as an alternative to the indictment of a public official. See
infra notes 243-60 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
, June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1226.
210 See R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 242-43.
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prosecutors2. and grand jurors212 believed was sufficient for indict-
ment.2"' Moreover, although Judge Sirica noted that the report was
"not a substitute for indictments where indictments might properly is-
sue," 21 4 it is unlikely he meant that the evidence detailed in the road
map was quantitatively insufficient to support a prosecution.21 5 Instead,
the comparison to such a situation more likely reflected Judge Sirica's
belief that the evidence was qualitatively insufficient to indict the Presi-
dent while in office.216
In addition, both reports implied that the chief executive should be
impeached.217 Although Judge Sirica stressed that the Watergate report
contained "no recommendations, advice or statements that infringe on
the prerogatives of other branches of government,"21 it was unneces-
"I1 See id. at 226.
112 The decision of the grand jurors to authorize the naming of the President as an
unindicted coconspirator supports the conclusion that they believed he committed crimi-
nal misconduct. See supra text accompanying note 141; see also R. BEN-VENISTE & G.
FRAMPTON, supra note 134, at 250-54 (jury's actions had the same impact as a formal
accusation of the President).
21 Indeed, this was precisely the conclusion the drafters of the report wished to
convey. See supra text accompanying note 148; see also Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d
714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part) ("The process of com-
posing the [road map] and selecting the evidence supporting it necessarily reflects a
conscious and focused judgment by the grand jury on the credibility of witnesses and
the inferences to be drawn from the totality of evidence presented to it.").
214 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1226.
215 That interpretation is particularly unlikely since a defendant is precluded from
challenging a federal indictment based on the claim that there was insufficient evidence
to indict. See infra note 236.
218 The question of whether the Watergate report was a "substitute for indict-
ments where indictments might properly issue" highlights an ambiguity in defining the
existence of the reporting authority by a bright line rule of whether or not the official
could have been indicted. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24. In one respect the
Watergate report may have revealed unindictable misconduct. If the President was im-
mune from prosecution, his misconduct was not indictable while he remained in office.
However, after that point, the President's misconduct was indictable. This ambiguity is
unlikely to present substantial problems in defining the scope of the reporting function
by reference to the question of "indictability," since it is doubtful whether any public
official besides the president can claim immunity from prosecution while in office. See
infra note 223.
217 It had previously been held that a federal grand jury report that recommends
action within the exclusive control of the executive or legislative branches violates the
separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
111 F. Supp. 858, 864-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The separation of powers objection to
reports that recommend action within the exclusive conduct of the legislative or execu-
tive branches is not persuasive. See 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 7, at § 3:01
(The grand jury is not a governmental body, and even were one to consider it an arm of
the court, a report should be no more suspect than a judicial opinion that calls for
legislative action.); McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 78 (1970) (The grand jury
lacks power to implement its decision and therefore poses no threat to the separation of
power.).
218 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1226.
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sary for the Watergate grand jury to recommend the initiation of im-
peachment proceedings since the proceedings were ongoing during the
grand jury investigation. Furthermore, the Watergate report subtly
stated that the grand jury would "presently" defer to the impeachment
inquiry, suggesting that the grand jury would indict the President were
he not impeached.21 Similarly, the Alaska grand jury recommended
that the legislature begin impeachment proceedings against the Gover-
nor, finding the Governor unfit for public office.220 Thus, although
neither report specifically recommended impeachment, both grand ju-
ries intimated that impeachment was appropriate.
While the reports are substantively similar, they differ in the
method of release. The Watergate report was transmitted only to the
House Judiciary Committee, while the Alaska report was publicly re-
leased. Transmittal of the Watergate report to the House Judiciary
Committee provided the President with the opportunity to respond to
the grand jury's evidence in an adversarial forum in which his accusers
would be required to establish that his misconduct warranted impeach-
ment. Although the Alaska grand jury recommended the creation of an
identical adversarial forum for the Governor by calling for the initia-
tion of impeachment proceedings, the Alaska legislature could have ig-
nored the grand jury's recommendation.221
The most significant difference between the reports was the prose-
cutors' reasons in each investigation for recommending against indict-
ment and in favor of a report. Jaworski argued against indictment pri-
marily because of the concern that the President was immune from
prosecution,222 whereas Frampton believed that a report offered a bet-
ter means of meeting the public interest in the accountability of public
officials.
Jaworski's concerns were rooted in the uncertainty of the law that
surrounds presidential immunity from prosecution.223 That uncertainty,
219 See supra note 158.
220 See supra note 16.
221 If the impeachment proceedings were not initiated, the Governor's only oppor-
tunity to respond to the report would have been in the public forum or through a
motion to expunge the report.
222 See supra text accompanying note 139.
223 The argument that public officials subject to impeachment are constitutionally
immune from prosecution while in office was rejected when raised by United States
Senators, see United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 520 (1972); Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-16 (1972), and federal judges, see United States v. Claiborne,
765 F.2d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1636 (1986); United States
v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709-12 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1203
(1983); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1140-44 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
In their brief in United States v. Nixon, the Watergate prosecutors did not concede
1987]
124 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
in the context of the Watergate grand jury investigation, seems suffi-
ciently compelling, by itself, to have justified the decision to forego in-
dicting the President in favor of transmitting key evidence of his mis-
conduct to the impeachment committee.
If the impeachment proceedings were the only available forum for
determining the President's responsibility for criminal misconduct,
transmittal of the Watergate report to Congress promoted three impor-
tant public interests. First, it furthered the public's right to know about
the President's misconduct since the grand jury's evidence inevitably
would, be revealed during the impeachment inquiry. Second, as noted
by Judge Sirica, the evidence transmitted in the Watergate report
helped to ensure "an unswerving[ly] fair [impeachment] inquiry based
on all the pertinent information. ' 224 Third, even if the President's mis-
conduct warranted a criminal prosecution, such a proceeding was im-
possible while he remained in office. Therefore, by aiding the impeach-
ment inquiry, the grand jury acted to expedite the President's
prosecution.
Moreover, the public interest, would not have been effectively
served by an indictment. Although the theory of the case would have
been revealed to the public, there was the risk that the President would
never be held accountable for criminal misconduct in either the im-
peachment inquiry or a prosecution. The impeachment hearings might
have faltered for lack of the grand jury's evidence,"' and the prosecu-
tors might have been unable to use that evidence in a criminal trial
since the indictment might have been dismissed due to the immunity
issue.
Espousing different reasons than those expressed by Jaworski in
the Watergate inquiry, Frampton, during the Alaska investigation, also
argued against indictment and in favor of a report. Frampton was not
concerned that the Governor was immune from prosecution;226 instead,
the immunity issue, noting that "[tihe Constitution ... contains no explicit Presiden-
tial immunity from the ordinary process of the criminal law prior to impeachment and
removal, and there are substantial arguments that an implicit immunity is likewise not
warranted by the Constitution." UNITED STATES V. NIXON, THE PRESIDENT BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 141, at 271 n.77 (quoting Brief for United States,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (No. 73-1834)); see supra note 139.
224 June, 1972 Report, 370 F. Supp. at 1230.
22 The impeachment proceedings were off to a slow start as the Watergate prose-
cutors considered how to proceed against the President, who refused to transmit sub-
poenaed evidence to Congress. Prosecutors feared that without congressional access to
the grand jury's evidence and road map the "momentum for impeachment might be
shattered no matter how strong the evidence." R. BEN-VENISTE & G. FRAMPTON,
supra note 134, at 241.
2' Frampton told the grand jury that there was no constitutional bar to indict-
ment. See Grand Jury Transcript, supra note 177, at 2568.
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Frampton favored a report as a more effective alternative than a prose-
cution for holding the Governor acountable for a criminal violation of
the public trust. He argued that a report could immediately hold the
Governor accountable and would avoid the possibility of the "most dis-
astrous result of all": the Governor's acquittal.227
When a grand jury investigation establishes an indictable violation
of the public trust, the grand jury may view the official's prompt re-
moval as a more important priority than prosecution. Particularly in
cases that involve high public officials, the desire to impose criminal
sanctions may seem secondary to an assurance that the official can no
longer violate the public trust. Frampton's remarks to the grand jury
reflected these concerns. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Part III of
this Article, these interests are not best protected when a report is used
as an alternative to a prosecution.
III. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE REPORTING FUNCTION
The preceding sections discussed the competing public and private
interests implicated by grand jury reports that reveal violations of the
public trust. The Article concludes by reviewing three categories of re-
ports to suggest the appropriate scope of the reporting authority.
A. Reports Revealing Violations of the Public Trust
That Are Not Indictable
1. Qualitative Insufficiency
The argument in favor of the reporting function is strongest when
the grand jury uncovers a violation of the public trust that is not regu-
lated by the criminal law, and a report reveals that violation without an
implication of criminal misconduct. This type of report exposes viola-
tions of the public trust where evidence of wrongdoing is qualitatively
insufficient to establish a crime, and thus the grand jury is unable to
reveal the official's misconduct by initiating a prosecution.228 Such a
227 See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
2 An example of misconduct that can be revealed in this type of report is illus-
trated by a variation on the campaign contribution hypothetical discussed earlier in the
Article. See supra text accompanying note 4.
Assume that a grand jury investigates allegations that a public official took a dis-
cretionary action to benefit a campaign contributor in return for a monetary bribe.
Assume further that reported campaign contributtions are specifically excluded from the
coverage of the bribery statute and that the investigation establishes that a contribution,
but nothing else, was received by the official as a quid pro quo for the action. If the
official placed the interests of the contributor above the interests of the public in taking
the action and no other criminal statute regulates the official's conduct, a report of the
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report furthers the public interest since it publicizes the official's mis-
conduct and thereby holds the official accountable under a stricter stan-
dard of conduct than that required by the criminal law. The issuance of
the report is also consistent with the historical role of the grand jury as
a citizen watchdog over both noncriminal and criminal misconduct in
government.
The concern that a grand jury report is indistinguishable from a
criminal accusation does not need to attach to reports issued because of
the qualitative insufficiency of evidence. Since the misconduct revealed
by the report is not covered by the criminal law, any possible public
confusion about the criminal nature of the misconduct can be elimi-
nated by including in the report a finding that explicitly exonerates the
official of criminal misconduct.229
The objection that the reporting function deprives public officials
of a forum in which to respond to the grand jury's findings can be
addressed by the adoption of a prepublication judicial review procedure
patterned after the New York model.230 Although public officials as-
sume the risk of increased scrutiny due to the nature of their office,
they retain a substantial interest in protecting their reputation from a
report's explicit or implicit finding that they have violated the public
trust. The only opportunities to respond to a report after its release
may be in the public forum or through a motion to expunge. These
opportunities may be inadequate, however, as the former merely offers
the official the possibility of partial exoneration and the latter may be
granted too late to undo the harm caused by an unsubstantiated
report.23'
Prepublication review provides a judicial forum in which the offi-
cial can block the release of an unsubstantiated report. During the re-
view, the grand jury should be required to establish that the official's
grand jury's investigation would be included within this category of reports.
In contrast, the Watergate report would not be included within this category since,
even if the President was immune from prosecution while in office, his conduct was
qualitatively sufficient to indict once he was no longer in office.
229 Cf. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(1)(b) (McKinney 1982) (authorizing
the grand jury to issue reports "[sitating that after investigation of a public servant it
,finds no misconduct, non-feasance or neglect in office by him provided tt~at such public
servant has requested the submission of such report").
230 See supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
21 See United States v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp. 786, 787-88 (D. Minn. 1955)
("The mere expunging of the report at this date would not remove any adverse effect of
... publicity. Rather, the result might be that further publicity would flow from such
ruling."), afl'd on other grounds sub nom. Brennan v. United States, 240 F.2d 253
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 931 (1957); In re Report of Grand Jury, 39 Md.
App. 472, 477, 386 A.2d 1246, 1249 (expungement is "a hollow victory" after a report
is published in newspapers), cert. denied, 283 Md. 734 (1978).
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violation of the public trust is not regulated by the criminal law, and
the court should delete any portions of the report that suggest criminal
misconduct.2 32 Regardless of whether it is a requirement of procedural
due process,2 3 prepublication review is necessary to protect an official
from the possibility of grand jury abuse. By doing so, it promotes pub-
lic confidence in the fairness of the reporting process.
2. Quantitative Insufficiency
Reports that reveal violations of the public trust where the evi-
dence of misconduct is quantitatively insufficient to indict2 34 are closely
related to those that reveal violations that are qualitatively insufficient.
In both instances, an official has violated the public trust and the grand
jury is unable to reveal the violation by indictment. Moreover, when
there exists a possibility of criminal misconduct, but the evidence is
quantitatively insufficient to indict, the public interest in learning of
violations of the public trust is at least as strong as when the miscon-
duct is not regulated by the criminal law. Nevertheless, unlike a report
that reveals evidence that is qualitatively insufficient to indict, one that
reveals evidence that is quantitatively insufficient will be vulnerable to
objections that it is indistinguishable from an indictment and was used
by the grand jury as an alternative to a criminal prosecution.
One can respond to the objection that such a report resembles a
criminal indictment in two ways. First, if the grand jury concludes that
the official's misconduct is not indictable, the report should explicitly
exonerate the official of criminal wrongdoing. Any possible interpreta-
tion that the report suggests criminality could be minimized if evidence
susceptible to such an interpretation is deleted. However, this approach
is unlikely to satisfy supporters of the reporting authority who will as-
sert the public's right to know all the evidence relevant to the official's
misconduct. An alternative approach would be to follow each portion of
the report that could be interpreted to suggest criminality with a re-
22 If the official's misconduct is regulated by the criminal law, or the report oth-
erwise suggests criminality, the public might view the report as the equivalent of a
criminal indictment, despite the grand jury's finding that exonerated the official of
criminal misconduct.
23 See supra note 73.
224 To illustrate, recall the hypothetical discussed supra note 4 and assume that
reported campaign contributions are specifically included within coverage of the bribery
statutes. Assume further that there is some evidence to suggest that the official was
aware of the contribution before taking action but that the evidence on this point is
conflicting and insufficient to establish probable cause that a crime occurred. Neverthe-
less, if the evidence establishes that the official took the action to benefit the contributor
and disregarded the public interest, a report that revealed the official's conduct would
be included within this category of report.
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statement of the grand jury's finding that exonerates the official of
criminal wrongdoing. This approach furthers the public's right to know
all the relevant evidence, while it protects the official's reputation from
unjustified suggestions of criminal misconduct.
Second, the objection that a report was used as an alternative to
criminal prosecution can be eliminated by requiring prepublication re-
view of the grand jury's determination that there is insufficient evidence
to indict. If that determination was not reviewable, a grand jury could
issue a report that exonerates an official of criminal misconduct yet
reveals overwhelming evidence of criminality. Such a report, despite its
finding exonerating the official, is likely to be viewed publicly as the
equivalent of a criminal accusation.235 A court, during prepublication
review, can prevent both of these possibilities by ensuring that there is
a reasonable basis for the grand jury's conclusion that there is insuffi-
cient evidence to indict.2"'
23' Furthermore, without prepublication review of the indictability issue, a grand
jury could avoid the prohibition suggested later in this Article against using a report as
an alternative to a prosecution simply by exonerating the official of criminal misconduct
even though it concludes that the misconduct is indictable. See infra text accompanying
notes 250-60.
2. The reasonable basis standard for review proposed in the text is intended to
allow the grand jury substantial discretion in determining whether or not evidence is
quantitatively insufficient to indict. This discretion is consistent with the deference
given by most courts to the grand jury's conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to
initiate a prosecution.
Although federal grand juries are required to find probable cause that the defend-
ant committed a crime in order to indict, the Supreme Court has precluded an attack
on an indictment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to indict. In Cos-
tello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), the Court held that "[an indictment re-
turned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by
the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the
merits." Id. at 363 (footnote omitted); see also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339,
348-50 (1958) (stating that valid indictment is not open to challenge on the grounds
that the evidence presented before the grand jury was inadequate or incompetent). Sim-
ilarly, most state courts preclude an attack on an indictment based on the ground that
there was insufficient evidence before the grand jury to establish probable cause. See
generally 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 7, § 10.20 (courts largely refuse to
consider challenges to nature or sufficiency of evidence supporting indictment); 2 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.4(c) (compiling state court decisions).
It can be argued that, in the case of the reporting function, the grand jury's deter-
mination that there is insufficient evidence to indict should not be reviewable, as is its
determination that there is sufficient evidence to initiate a prosecution. Not having
heard the testimony of grand jury witnesses, a court is unable to adequately assess
questions of witness credibility that are central to the grand jury's decision whether or
not to indict. The burden placed on a court to determine whether there is insufficient
evidence to indict may not outweigh the possibility that a report that exonerates an
official of criminality could nevertheless be publicly viewed as the equivalent of a crimi-
nal accusation.
The argument against judicial review is appealing, but it does not consider that
one of the purposes of review is to determine whether the report has been used as an
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B. Reports Revealing Violations of the Public Trust
When the Grand Jury Is Uncertain Whether or Not
the Misconduct Is Indictable
In some investigations the grand jury and prosecutor may be un-
certain as to whether or not an official's misconduct is indictable.
Quantitative evidentiary problems, however, are unlikely to be the
cause of such uncertainty. Grand juries routinely apply probable cause
or prima facie evidence standards in initiating prosecutions, 2 37 and if a
grand jury concludes that there is insufficient evidence to indict, it can
prepare a report. 238 A more common cause of uncertainty as to the
indictability of an official's misconduct will be qualitative evidentiary
problems, since the criminality of the conduct often depends on unset-
tled questions of law.
When the qualitative sufficiency of the evidence is in doubt, the
grand jury and prosecutor will be hesitant to indict but, at the same
time, reluctant to issue a report that exonerates the official of criminal
wrongdoing. The grand jury's hesitancy to indict will arise from its
realization that the evidentiary issue may lead a judge either to dismiss
an indictment for failure to allege an offense or to reverse a conviction.
When the qualitative sufficiency of the evidence is in doubt, the grand
jury and prosecutor may conclude that it is inappropriate to require the
state to initiate a prosecution and unfair to require the official to defend
herself against criminal charges. A finding that exonerates the official
of criminal wrongdoing, however, may be premature, since the official's
violation of the public trust, in the end, may be regulated by the crimi-
nal law.
There are two alternative ways for a grand jury to exercise its
reporting authority when it is uncertain whether or not misconduct is
alternative to a prosecution. Later in this Article, it is argued that the public interest
will not be served if the grand jury decides that a report is more effective than a prose-
cution to hold an official accountable for a criminal violation of the public trust. See
infra text accompanying notes 245-62. Prepublication review of the quantitative suffi-
ciency of the evidence helps ensure that a report has not been used as an alternative to
a prosecution.
The standard of review proposed in the text requires judicial review but minimizes
the burden imposed on the court. The review standard does not require the court to
determine whether or not the official's misconduct is indictable, but only whether there
is a reasonable basis for the grand jury's conclusion. This standard should be easy to
apply and adequate to deter the grand jury from using this type of report as an alterna-
tive to a prosecution.
237 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
238 The report should still be subject to prepublication review where the court
must determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the grand jury's conclusion. See
supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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regulated by the criminal law. Under the first, the grand jury can pre-
pare a report that reveals the official's misconduct and discusses why
the criminality of that conduct is questionable under existing law.2 39
The report could also state the grand jury's conclusion that it would be
inappropriate to initiate a prosecution because of the uncertain cover-
age of the substantive law. During prepublication review, the court
should determine that the indictability of the official's misconduct is
unsettled before it releases the report.240 Although this type of report
does not specifically exonerate the official of criminal misconduct, the
inference of criminality is significantly mitigated by the grand jury's
acknowledgement that the misconduct might not be regulated by the
criminal law.
The second alternative is to require the grand jury to prepare a
report that exonerates the official of criminal misconduct. The qualita-
tive evidentiary issue would then be determined during prepublication
review. If the court concludes that the official's misconduct is not regu-
lated by the criminal law, the report will be released. However, if the
court concludes that the misconduct is indictable, it should bar publica-
tion of the report and give the grand jury the opportunity to indict the
official.
This approach ostensibly accommodates the interests of both the
public and the official. If the official's misconduct is held to be indicta-
ble during prepublication review, the grand jury's reluctance to indict
will be alleviated, and a prosecution will be initiated. Alternatively, if
the misconduct is found not to be regulated by the criminal law, the
report will specifically exonerate the official of criminal misconduct and
will not be challenged as being indistinguishable from a criminal accu-
sation. There is, nevertheless, a significant problem with this approach.
Requiring judicial determination of qualitative evidentiary issues dur-
ing prepublication review allows an official to object to a report on the
basis that misconduct is indictable and therefore actionable only
through a prosecution.241 The official may take this position after cal-
'3 The Alaska Impeachment Report, in discussing the applicability of the crime
of official misconduct to the Governor's conduct, followed a similar approach. See
supra note 206.
240 If the official's misconduct is clearly regulated by the criminal law, the public
is likely to view the report as the equivalent of a criminal accusation despite the grand
jury's statement that the coverage of the law is uncertain. In such a situation, the report
should not be published.
241 See supra note 119 (comments of Rep. Eckhart). Theoretically, the official
could also raise a similar objection when the grand jury prepares a report after con-
cluding that the official's misconduct is qualitatively insufficient to indict. See supra
text accompanying notes 228-34. However, for that category of report, the
nonindictability of the official's misconduct will be readily apparent, see supra note
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culating that, even if the court agrees, the grand jury and prosecutor
may still be unwilling to indict because of uncertainty as to whether the
evidence is quantitatively sufficient to establish a crime at a trial.
Moreover, the prosecutor might hesitate to recommend indictment out
of fear that a conviction will be reversed on appeal because of a holding
on the qualitative evidentiary issue contrary to the one rendered during
prepublication review. Thus, it may be in the best interests of an offi-
cial to argue that alleged misconduct is indictable if this strategy results
in nonpublication of the report, followed by a grand jury decision not to
indict.242 Should this occur, the official's misconduct will not be re-
vealed, and the public interest, in learning of the violation of the public
trust will be frustrated. Alternatively, if the grand jury decides to in-
dict, there remains the possibility that the official will be acquitted even
though she violated the public trust. Because the second alternative
forces the grand jury to initiate a prosecution to reveal an indictable
violation of the public trust, it raises the issue of whether the grand
jury should have the authority to use the reporting function as an alter-
native to a prosecution.
C. The Use of a Report as an Alternative to a Prosecution
As the Alaska Impeachment Report illustrates, a grand jury some-
times issues a report even though it has concluded that a public official
has committed an indictable violation of the public trust. If the evidence
uncovered by a grand jury is both quantitatively and qualitatively suffi-
cient to indict, the publication of a report is not the sole means of dis-
closing the official's violation of the public trust. Indeed, the only public
interests furthered by such a report concern the possible advantages of
the report as an alternative to prosecution. Those perceived advantages
were discussed by Special Counsel Frampton in his remarks to the
Alaska grand jury.
Frampton argued that a report allows the grand jury to publicize
official wrongdoing in a more comprehensive and timely manner than it
could through a prosecution.243 Following release, an outraged public
presumably would react quickly to the evidence of misconduct and de-
228, and it is therefore extremely unlikely that the official will make or succeed in the
argument discussed in the accompanying text.
242 This strategy also carries high risks for the official. If the court agrees that the
misconduct is indictable, and a prosecution is initiated, the official is exposed to the
possibility of a criminal sanction. Additionally, by arguing during prepublication re-
view that the misconduct is qualitatively sufficient to indict, the official has most likely
precluded her ability to make a contrary argument in attempting to have a conviction
reversed on appeal.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 186-89.
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mand that the official be held accountable. If the official is subject to
constitutionally or statutorily prescribed removal or disciplinary pro-
ceedings, the public may call for the initiation of those proceedings. If
the official serves at the pleasure of an appointing authority, the public
may pressure that authority to dismiss the official. Consequently, the
report may be viewed as being preferable to a prosecution because it
might bring about the official's removal or discipline with greater expe-
diency.244 These goals may seem more important to the grand jury and
prosecutor than the possibility of a criminal sanction. z4'
Since prepublication judicial review is essential to the reporting
function when a grand jury reveals misconduct that is not indictable,2"
the need for that review is even more critical when a report is used as
an alternative to prosecution. Since the release of a report does not by
itself provide an adversarial forum for an official to answer the grand
jury's express or implied charges of criminal misconduct, the official
should at least have the opportunity to test the accuracy of the report
before publication. However, prepublication review eliminates the per-
ceived advantage of a report as a device that comprehensively reveals
the official's misconduct more quickly than an indictment. Assuming
that the official objects to release, and recognizing that the report will
remain sealed throughout the judicial review and appeal process,247
244 The Alaska Impeachment Report in fact publicized the Governor's alleged
misconduct in a timely and detailed fashion. One day after the grand jury completed its
comprehensive report, the report was released. The grand jury completed its report on
July 1, 1985. See ALASKA IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 69. The report
was released on July 2, 1985. See Grand Jury Transcript, supra note 177, at 2724.
The speed with which the report was released, however, was only possible because
prepublication judicial review was virtually nonexistent, and the Governor did not have
the opportunity to review and object to the report before release, and did not participate
in the initial judicial release decision. See id. at 2722-24; see also ALASKA JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 8 (Prosecutors filed a brief in support of grand jury's
request that report be made public; "no other parties participated in the hearings on
this request.").
24 Standards that regulate prosecutorial discretion recognize that a decision to
decline prosecution may be based on a conclusion that the public interest can best be
served by the noncriminal disposition of a case. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
supra note 114, at B.1.(d) (1980) (prosecutor with probable cause to believe crime has
been committed may decline prosecution and recommend a noncriminal disposition); id.
at B.2.(c) (prosecution may be declined if there exists an adequate noncriminal alterna-
tive to prosecution); id. at B.5.(a) (in deciding whether to decline prosecution in favor
of noncriminal disposition, the prosecutor may consider all relevant factors including
"the sanctions available under the alternative means of disposition"); see also STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.9(b) (Approved Draft 1971)
("The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the
public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence exists which would
support a conviction.").
246 See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
[Vol. 136:73
GRAND JURY REPORTS
there is likely to be a substantial delay between the report's preparation
and its publication.248 The grand jury's goal of immediately publicizing
the official's misconduct would be better served by an indictment since
indictments are not subject to judicial review prior to release.249 Al-
though the indictment is unlikely to disclose as many of the relevant
facts as a report, it will highlight the general "theory of the case," and
additional information will be revealed during the pretrial proceedings.
Even with the delay inherent in prepublication review, the grand
jury might still conclude that publication of a report is preferable to
prosecution. There are at least two possible reasons for that conclusion:
first, the grand jury may calculate that a report, even with its delayed
publication, will still result in the official's removal or discipline more
quickly than a prosecution; second, the grand jury may recognize that
prosecution creates the possibility that the official may be acquitted and
claim exoneration, even though the official's conduct violated the public
trust.25 While these reasons suggest that a grand jury should not al-
ways be required to choose between an indictment and a no-true bill
whenever it identifies an indictable violation of the public trust, they do
not support the conclusion that the third alternative available to the
grand jury should be a public report that reveals the official's
misconduct.
When a report is used as an alternative to prosecution, the grand
jury has in fact passed the buck to an authority with the ability to
discipline or remove the official. Unless that authority acts in response
to the report, however, the official will escape any direct and immediate
sanction for the misconduct, and absent statutory or constitutional au-
thorization, a grand jury is powerless to require that the removing or
disciplinary authority proceed against the official.251 Thus, if the grand
248 Cf Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1955) (In a case that involved
review of the sufficiency of evidence behind a grand jury indictment, Justice Black
noted that "[i]f indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there
was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed.").
249 See id. ("An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand
jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits.
The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.").
250 Both reasons were considered by the Alaska grand jury in deciding to forego
prosecution of the Governor. See supra text accompanying notes 186-94.
211 Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, the judicial council may certify to the
Judicial Conference that grounds for impeachment of a federal judge exist, and if the
Conference agrees, it "shall so certify and transmit the determination and the record of
proceedings to the House of Representatives for whatever action the House of Repre-
sentatives considers to be necessary." 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(7)(B), (c)(8) (1982); In in-
terpreting this statute, the Eleventh Circuit held that although the judicial council can
make an impeachment recommendation, the House has the sole power to impeach and
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jury does not indict, and if no action is taken by the authority in re-
sponse to the report, the public interest in holding the official accounta-
ble for violating the public trust will be frustrated.
252
Frustration of the public interest may also occur if the removing or
disciplinary authority acts on the grand jury's recommendation. 53 Once
a removal or disciplinary proceeding is initiated, the official will almost
certainly use that forum to attack the legality of the report.2 54 Doubts
about the legality of a report will in turn call into question the overall
fairness of the grand jury's investigation, and give the official's political
supporters a reason not to act on the grand jury's findings.255 Conse-
quently, even if the report survives prepublication review and triggers
the initiation of a removal or disciplinary action, the focus of that in-
quiry may shift from the alleged misconduct of the official to the legal-
ity of the grand jury report.
If the removing or disciplinary authority does act in response to
the report, the official's responsibility for violating the public trust
could be judged by a standard of conduct that is more demanding of the
official,256 and by a standard of proof that is less demanding of society,
than would be applicable in a criminal prosecution.257 A stricter stan-
dard of conduct and a reduced burden of proof are two significant ad-
vantages of foregoing prosecution to determine, outside of a criminal
trial, the official's accountability for violating the public trust. In com-
bination, these advantages remove the possibility that the official can
claim exoneration because misconduct, although a violation of the pub-
lic trust, is insufficient to establish the elements of a crime beyond a
"is free to act upon [the council's] information or ignore it, as it chooses." In re Certain
Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1511 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Hastings v. Gobold, 106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986).
252 In the case of reports that concern elected public officials, one could argue that
publication of the report by itself holds the official accountable since the evidence re-
vealed can be considered by the public in the next election.
253 A report such as the Alaska Impeachment Report may effectively leave the
disciplinary or removing authority little choice but to quickly proceed against the criti-
cized official. Politically, at least, it may be impossible to ignore a report that calls for
an official's removal and explicitly or implicitly accuses the official of a criminal viola-
tion of the public trust.
2I Cf supra note 19 (citing public criticisms of the Alaska Impeachment Report).
255 See Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Aug. 29, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (quoting conclu-
sions of Governor's counsel and the counsel to the State Senate that impeachment pro-
ceedings were conducted on a partisan basis).
256 By not indicting, the grand jury seeks to have a violation of the public trust
judged under the demanding fiduciary duties standards imposed on public officials
rather than within the narrower definition of criminal conduct.
257 For example, during the Alaska impeachment hearings the burden of proof for
establishing an impeachable offense was set at a "clear and convincing" evidence stan-
dard. See supra note 16.
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reasonable doubt. 2 5s
As the above discussion indicates, however, it is questionable
whether a public report can accomplish the grand jury's goals of fore-
going prosecution. The perceived advantage of a re-
port-comprehensively and quickly revealing the official's miscon-
duct-may be eliminated by prepublication judicial review. Even if the
report is released, there is no assurance that the removing or discipli-
nary authority will proceed against the official. Even if it does, ques-
tions as to the report's legality may detract from the weight given to the
grand jury's findings. 259 The use of a report as an alternative to the
prosecution of an indictable offense, therefore, is not guaranteed to ac-
complish any significant benefit for the public.
Statutory authorization to use a public report as an alternative to
prosecution would only slightly improve the likelihood that the report
will accomplish the grand jury's goals. That authorization only removes
the "shadow of illegality" 260 surrounding the report; it does not allow
the report to be released as quickly as an indictment, nor does it re-
quire the removing or disciplinary authority to act in response to the
report. Unless the grand jury's decision to forego prosecution promptly
requires consideration of its evidence in a removal or disciplinary action
against a public official, the use of a report as an alternative to a prose-
cution should be beyond the scope of the reporting authority.
D. Adapting the Reporting Function to Provide
a Viable Alternative to Prosecution When a Violation
of the Public Trust Is Indictable
Although the release of a public report is ill-suited to further the
grand jury's goals in foregoing prosecution, the reporting function can
25 Of course, there is nothing to prevent a removal or disciplinary action against
the official after an indictment or at the conclusion of a criminal trial. But if the pri-
mary concern of the grand jury is the prompt disciplining or removal of the official, the
question of whether or not the violation of the public trust is quantitatively and quali-
tatively sufficient to support a conviction is largely irrelevant. Although the gravity of
the misconduct will in part be measured by whether it violates the criminal law, the
criminality of the misconduct is not dispositive as to whether the public trust has been
violated. The initiation of a prosecution, however, may effectively merge the two issues
in the minds of the public and the removing or disciplinary authority. The question of
whether criminal liability can be established may become synonymous with the issue of
whether the public trust has been violated. Once the official is indicted, there may be a
reluctance to begin removal or disciplinary proceedings until the criminal case is re-
solved, and if the official is acquitted, there may be a corresponding reluctance to initi-
ate a noncriminal inquiry.
29 Cf supra note 16 (quoting remarks of Sen. Ferguson).
280 Kuh, supra note 6, at 1103; see also supra note 7.
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be adapted to provide a viable alternative to prosecution. One such al-
ternative exists in several states, where the grand jury may conclude an
investigation of official misconduct by recommending the removal of
public officials holding specified offices. 261 The recommendation may
be based on an accusation that the official committed a noncriminal or
a criminal violation of the public trust.28 2 A removal proceeding is au-
tomatically initiated in response to the grand jury's recommendation
263
and, in that proceeding, the state's attorney or a local district or county
attorney must establish the official's misconduct.264 The proceeding is
heard by a jury,265 and the official is entitled to cross-examine wit-
nesses and to present a defense. 26 Removal is automatic if the grand
jury's accusation of misconduct is established. 67 Several states require
261 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-4-1, -4-3 (1978) (any elected county, pre-
cinct, district, city, town or village officer elected by the people); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 44-10-02 (1978 & Supp. 1987) ("district, county, township, city, or municipal of-
ficer, school board member, or any state officer not liable to impeachment"); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1181, 1182 (West 1986) ("[any officer not subject to impeach-
ment elected or appointed to any state, county, township, city, town, or other office");
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-6-1 to -6-2 (1982) ("justices of the peace and all officers of
any city, county or other political subdivision . . . not liable to impeachment").
212 See, e.g., N.M. STAT ANN. § 10-4-2 (1978) (several grounds including con-
viction of a crime, "failure, neglect or refusal to discharge any duty devolving upon the
officer by virtue of his office" and "gross incompetency or gross negligence in discharg-
ing the duties of the office"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-10-02 (1978 & Supp. 1987)
(several grounds including "misconduct, malfeasance, crime, or misdemeanor in office
• . . or gross incompetency"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1181 (West 1986) (several
grounds including "habitual or willful neglect of duty" and "corruption in office");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-1 (1982) ("high crimes and misdemeanors or malfeasance in
office").
26 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-5 (1978) (district attorney shall serve a
copy of the accusation on the accused and require that she appear before the district
court and answer); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-10-04, -05 (1978) (same); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1184 (West 1986) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-4 (1982) (same).
264 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-5 (1978) (district attorney); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 44-10-04 (1978) (state's attorney); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1184 (West
1986) (district attorney); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-4 (1982) (county attorney).
285 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-12 (1978) (trial must be by jury); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 44-10-11 (1978) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1191 (West
1986) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-77 (1982) (statute refers to court trial, but
official is allowed a jury trial, see Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Utah
1985)).
268 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-12 (1978) (trial to be conducted in the
same manner as a trial on an information or indictment for a misdemeanor); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 44-10-11 (1978) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1191 (West
1986) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-7 (1982) (procedures for civil trial apply).
2'7 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-14 (1978) (The court must pronounce
judgment that the defendant be removed from office upon conviction.); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 44-10-12 (1978) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1192 (West 1986)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-8 (1982) ("The court shall enter judgment against
him directing the defendant be removed from office.").
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that the accusation be established beyond a reasonable doubt,268 while
others require the accusation to be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.
26 9
This procedure incorporates many of the advantages that the
grand jury seeks, but does not necessarily realize, when it uses a public
report as an alternative to a prosecution. Since the grand jury's removal
recommendation automatically triggers an adversarial proceeding, the
basis for that recommendation is not subject to judicial review before
release.270 The grand jury can therefore quickly publicize an official's
misconduct even though the official has not been indicted. The grand
jury is also assured that the official's responsibility for violating the
public trust will be determined in a proceeding in which the legality of
the decision to forego prosecution is not in dispute. Finally, the official
can be removed for violating the public trust regardless of whether that
violation constitutes a crime. The official can therefore be held account-
able under a stricter standard of conduct than that required by the
criminal law, and it is impossible for the official to claim exoneration
because the breach of fiduciary duty may have been insufficient to es-
tablish criminal liability.
This removal procedure does not, however, address all of the situ-
ations in which a grand jury may wish to forego prosecution in order to
take some other action to hold an official accountable for violating the
public trust. Since the grand jury's accusation must trigger a removal
proceeding, the grand jury is unable to initiate any action short of re-
moval, such as censure or discipline. The removal procedure could be
expanded, however, to permit the grand jury to initiate a disciplinary
proceeding against the official or to trigger a proceeding before an eth-
ics commision or comparable agency.
In cases where a public official is subject to constitutionally-pre-
scribed removal or impeachment proceedings, the grand jury is pre-
cluded from automatically initiating that procedure through its accusa-
268 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Medler, 17 N.M. 644, 651, 131 P. 976, 979 (1913) ("[A]
person who has been elected to an office ... is not to be summarily removed ... until
his dereliction is made to appear beyond all reasonable doubt."); State v. Raedeker, 158
Okla. 248, 251, 13 P.2d 148, 150 (1932) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
269 See, e.g., State v. Borstad, 27 N.D. 533, 540, 147 N.W. 380, 382-83 (1914)
(statute provides for civil rules on trial; jury instruction requiring "fair preponderance
of the evidence" proper); Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1186, 1091 (Utah 1985) (unani-
mous verdict not required); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-6-7 (1982) ("The rights
of the parties and the procedures used shall be the same as in any civil proceeding.").
270 Since the grand jury's removal recommendation can be based on a finding of
criminal or noncriminal misconduct, prepublication review is not required to determine
whether the report has been used as an alternative to prosecution. See supra notes 234-
35 and accompanying text.
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tion.2 71 Similarly, officials who are constitutionally subject to removal
or discipline at the discretion of their appointing authority may not be
covered by a removal procedure automatically initiated by a grand
jury.2 2 For the former category of official, the circumstances illustrated
by the Watergate grand jury investigation and report provide another
example of how the reporting function can be adapted to provide a
viable alternative to prosecution.
In instances where a constitutionally prescribed removal proceed-
ing has already been initiated, the grand jury should have the authority
to conclude its investigation by transmitting evidence to the removing
authority even though that evidence may support a criminal indictment.
Under these circumstances the grand jury is assured that its evidence
will be considered in determining the official's accountability for violat-
ing the public trust, and the official is assured of an adversarial forum
in which to challenge the grand jury's findings.
CONCLUSION
In most criminal investigations, the grand jury performs two roles:
it shields the accused from unjustified prosecution and it acts as a
sword with which the state can bring the guilty to justice. In cases that
involve misconduct by public officials, however, the grand jury histori-
cally has performed a third role by publicizing violations of the public
trust, even though the misconduct may have been insufficient to estab-
lish a violation of the criminal law. The common law grand jury, by
assuming this watchdog role over government and public officials, fur-
thered a worthwhile objective. At the same time, however, the reporting
function planted the seeds of conflict between the grand jury's two pri-
mary roles.
The reporting function combines aspects of the grand jury's sword
and shield roles. The grand jury's ability to investigate and report on
official misconduct serves as a sword that holds public officials account-
271 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-10-02 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (Written accu-
sation of public officer by grand jury may be presented to district court except against
"a representative in Congress [or] a member of the legislative assembly. . . ."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1181 (West 1986) ("Any officer not subject to impeachment...
may be removed from office" based on written accusation of grand jury.); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-6-1 ("All . . . officers . . . not liable to impeachment shall be subject to
removal" based on written accusation of grand jury.); ef In re Certain Complaints
Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1511 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hastings
v. Gobold, 106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986) (While judicial council can recommend impeach-
ment, House of Representatives is free to ignore that recommendation.).
272 Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (statute requiring congres-
sional consent for removal of officer of the United States held unconsitutional as re-
stricting president's power to remove appointed officer).
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able under a stricter standard of conduct than that required by the
criminal law. At the same time, the report must shield the official from
accusations of misconduct that are not supported by the evidence. The
report accuses, but not in the same way as an indictment; it shields, but
not in the same way as a no-true bill.
The authority to reveal violations of the public trust without initi-
ating a prosecution remains one of the most controversial functions of
the modern grand jury. Despite that controversy, grand juries continue
to exercise a watchdog role over government by revealing official mis-
conduct without returning an indictment. As the Alaska Impeachment
Report illustrates, the reporting function is sometimes exercised even
though a public official could have been indicted.
The appropriate scope of the reporting function can be defined by
focusing on the issues of why the grand jury prepares its report and
whether or not the violation of the public trust uncovered during its
investigation is indictable. If the violation is not regulated by the crimi-
nal law or if there is insufficient evidence to indict, the reporting func-
tion furthers the compelling interest of protecting the public's right to
know about the conduct of government officials. In doing so, the report
helps to hold officials accountable under a stricter standard of conduct
than that required by the criminal law. By taking office, a public offi-
cial voluntarily assumes an increased risk of scrutiny that should in-
clude the possibility that violations of the public trust will be revealed
through a judicially regulated reporting function designed to minimize
abuse and to maximize accuracy.
If the grand jury is uncertain as to whether or not misconduct is
regulated by the criminal law, a report that reveals the misconduct and
explicitly acknowledges the uncertain criminal nature of the conduct
furthers the public interest by publicizing a violation of the public trust.
The reporting function, under these circumstances, minimizes the possi-
bility that the state will devote scarce resources to pursuing a prosecu-
tion of questionable merit simply to reveal noncriminal misconduct. Al-
though tlie report is susceptible to an interpretation suggesting criminal
wrongdoing, the official's interest in requiring a grand jury criminal
accusation to be established at trial beyond a reasonable doubt is sub-
stantially reduced. The report does not accuse the official of criminal
misconduct but instead concedes that the criminality of the violation of
the public trust is uncertain.
A different balance between the public and private interests impli-
cated by the reporting function is required when the grand jury con-
cludes that misconduct is indictable but nevertheless prepares a report
as a preferred alternative to prosecution. The goals that a grand jury
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seeks to achieve by foregoing prosecution may be in the best interests of
society, but a public report is unlikely to accomplish those objectives.
The public interest in holding an official accountable for violating the
public trust is more likely to be hindered than furthered when the
grand jury foregoes prosecution in favor of issuing a report.
When a report is used as an alternative to prosecution, the inter-
ests of the public official are entitled to substantial weight. Because the
report reveals indictable misconduct it is likely to be viewed publicly as
the equivalent of a criminal accusation. Since the grand jury concluded
that the misconduct was indictable, its report cannot exonerate the offi-
cial of criminal wrongdoing or acknowledge that indictability is uncer-
tain. Even if the report concedes that it may be diffficult to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it will still convey the grand jury's
belief that the misconduct is indictable. Since publication of the report
does not ensure the creation of an adversarial forum for response, the
official's interest in requiring an explicit or implicit grand jury accusa-
tion of criminal misconduct to be established at trial beyond a reasona-
ble doubt outweighs the public interest that is arguably furthered by
the report. Unless the reporting function is adapted to provide that the
grand jury's decision to forego prosecution requires prompt considera-
tion of its evidence in a disciplinary or removal proceeding, the use of a
report as an alternative to a prosecution should be beyond the scope of
the grand jury's authority.
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